Publications
1. “‘The Soul Is, in a Way, All Beings’: Heidegger’s Debts to Aristotle in Being and Time,” Inquiry, 67 (10), 2024: 3930–3968.
This paper develops a novel interpretation of Dasein, as we find it in Heidegger’s Being and Time. On this interpretation, Heidegger models this most famous of all his concepts after Aristotle’s account of the soul from De Anima as isomorphic with whatever it currently cognises. Indeed, Dasein proves central to the inquiry into Being he attempts in that book precisely because, like soul, it is capable of becoming like all beings.
Published Version / Pre-Published Version
2. “Why Being Fragments,” Synthese, 2023: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04403-z (ahead of print.)
This paper develops a new argument for ontological pluralism – the thesis that being fragments. The argument goes, roughly, as follows. It is conceivable that some beings are ontologically dissimilar. So, it is possible that some beings are ontologically dissimilar. This is sufficient for ontological pluralism. So, being fragments.
Published Version / Pre-published Version
3. “Aristotelian Rhapsody: Did Aristotle Pick His Categories as They Came His Way?” Inquiry, 2023: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2211425 (ahead of print).
In the first Critique, Kant raises two objections against Aristotle’s categories. Kant’s concern, in the first instance, is whether Aristotle generated all categories that there are and if he did not generate any spurious categories. However, for Kant, this is only a symptom of the second – deeper – flaw in Aristotle’s thinking. According to Kant, Aristotle generated his categories ‘on no common principle.’ This paper develops the two Kantian objections, offers an overview of Brentano’s (1862) reconstruction of Aristotle’s categories (which claims to have addressed them), develops three objections to this reconstruction, and recommends Trendelenburg (1846) as a better – albeit still flawed – Aristotelian reply to Kant.
Published Version / Pre-Published Version
4. “Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus Argument’ Entail Ontological Pluralism?” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 104 (4), 2022: 688-711.
This paper differentiates between two readings of Aristotle’s argument that unity and being are not “genē” (UBANG for short). On the first reading – proposed by commentators such as Ackrill, Shields, Loux, and McDaniel – UBANG entails the proposition that there are no features that characterise all beings insofar as they are, referred to by its contemporary proponents, including McDaniel, as ‘ontological pluralism’. On the second reading – proposed here – UBANG does not entail this proposition. The paper argues that only on the second reading does Aristotle’s argument secure its conclusion, that the second reading is, in fact, the correct reading of UBANG, and that anyone who thinks that UBANG succeeds and entails ontological pluralism probably equivocates between two different senses of ‘genos’.
Published Version / Pre-Published Version
5. “The Logic of Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time,” The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 19, 2022: 220-254.
McDaniel argues that Heidegger’s accounts of the kinds of being in Being and Time (such as Dasein, the ready-to-hand, and the present-at-hand) might be understood as spelling out meanings of different restricted existential quantifiers whose domains do not overlap. This paper develops three objections to this proposal and, ultimately, a different view of the logical form of Heidegger’s kinds of being as disjuncts of the reality-predicate described by Fine applicable to any of the objects in the domain of the unrestricted existential quantifier some facts about which “ground” all facts about the remaining objects in this domain (the membership in which is denied the ontological significance invested in it by Quine and, following him, many other analytic philosophers including McDaniel).
Published Version / Pre-Published Version
1. “‘The Soul Is, in a Way, All Beings’: Heidegger’s Debts to Aristotle in Being and Time,” Inquiry, 67 (10), 2024: 3930–3968.
This paper develops a novel interpretation of Dasein, as we find it in Heidegger’s Being and Time. On this interpretation, Heidegger models this most famous of all his concepts after Aristotle’s account of the soul from De Anima as isomorphic with whatever it currently cognises. Indeed, Dasein proves central to the inquiry into Being he attempts in that book precisely because, like soul, it is capable of becoming like all beings.
Published Version / Pre-Published Version
2. “Why Being Fragments,” Synthese, 2023: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04403-z (ahead of print.)
This paper develops a new argument for ontological pluralism – the thesis that being fragments. The argument goes, roughly, as follows. It is conceivable that some beings are ontologically dissimilar. So, it is possible that some beings are ontologically dissimilar. This is sufficient for ontological pluralism. So, being fragments.
Published Version / Pre-published Version
3. “Aristotelian Rhapsody: Did Aristotle Pick His Categories as They Came His Way?” Inquiry, 2023: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2211425 (ahead of print).
In the first Critique, Kant raises two objections against Aristotle’s categories. Kant’s concern, in the first instance, is whether Aristotle generated all categories that there are and if he did not generate any spurious categories. However, for Kant, this is only a symptom of the second – deeper – flaw in Aristotle’s thinking. According to Kant, Aristotle generated his categories ‘on no common principle.’ This paper develops the two Kantian objections, offers an overview of Brentano’s (1862) reconstruction of Aristotle’s categories (which claims to have addressed them), develops three objections to this reconstruction, and recommends Trendelenburg (1846) as a better – albeit still flawed – Aristotelian reply to Kant.
Published Version / Pre-Published Version
4. “Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus Argument’ Entail Ontological Pluralism?” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 104 (4), 2022: 688-711.
This paper differentiates between two readings of Aristotle’s argument that unity and being are not “genē” (UBANG for short). On the first reading – proposed by commentators such as Ackrill, Shields, Loux, and McDaniel – UBANG entails the proposition that there are no features that characterise all beings insofar as they are, referred to by its contemporary proponents, including McDaniel, as ‘ontological pluralism’. On the second reading – proposed here – UBANG does not entail this proposition. The paper argues that only on the second reading does Aristotle’s argument secure its conclusion, that the second reading is, in fact, the correct reading of UBANG, and that anyone who thinks that UBANG succeeds and entails ontological pluralism probably equivocates between two different senses of ‘genos’.
Published Version / Pre-Published Version
5. “The Logic of Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time,” The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 19, 2022: 220-254.
McDaniel argues that Heidegger’s accounts of the kinds of being in Being and Time (such as Dasein, the ready-to-hand, and the present-at-hand) might be understood as spelling out meanings of different restricted existential quantifiers whose domains do not overlap. This paper develops three objections to this proposal and, ultimately, a different view of the logical form of Heidegger’s kinds of being as disjuncts of the reality-predicate described by Fine applicable to any of the objects in the domain of the unrestricted existential quantifier some facts about which “ground” all facts about the remaining objects in this domain (the membership in which is denied the ontological significance invested in it by Quine and, following him, many other analytic philosophers including McDaniel).
Published Version / Pre-Published Version
Under Review
- A paper about Aristotle and pros hen homonymy (R&R)
- A paper about naturalness/structure
- Two papers about the ontological difference
- A paper about time
(drafts available upon request)
- A paper about Aristotle and pros hen homonymy (R&R)
- A paper about naturalness/structure
- Two papers about the ontological difference
- A paper about time
(drafts available upon request)
DPhil Thesis
- “The Structure of Being (in Heidegger’s Being and Time)”
“Ontological pluralism” (OP) – supported today by philosophers such as McDaniel (2009, 2017) and Turner (2010) – claims that ‘being’ (in its existential sense) picks out a number of different features of reality that do not share any common characteristics. But if OP is not a view about these common characteristics – of which, it claims, there are none – then is it a view about anything? McManus (2013) argues that Heidegger – an outspoken historical advocate of OP – failed to address this problem and several related challenges that arise for him from his commitment to OP. However, I argue that Heidegger in fact solves it (as well as some other challenges raised for him by McManus) in Section 4 of his Being and Time, where he claims that the inquiry into Being that he proposes must take the form of an inquiry into “Dasein”: into the kind of being enjoyed by whoever can undertake such an inquiry. On my interpretation, Heidegger takes guidance from Aristotle, who argues in Metaphysics, Gamma 2 that substance is the central modality of Being, to which other modalities are related in the “pros hen” way, and, as such, also the principal object of the “science of being as being.” I argue that what distinguishes Dasein from other kinds of being is its capacity to be affected by Being in all of its diverse modalities (all of which bear on Heidegger’s inquiry into Being that Dasein is said to be able to perform) and that, in like manner, it is the process through which different kinds of being leave their imprint on Dasein (an instance of Aristotle’s formal causation) that holds Heidegger’s conception of Being together as the subject-matter of a single inquiry.
In Chapter 1, I offer an analysis of the challenges to Heidegger’s version of OP raised by McManus (2013), and I answer some of them directly. In Chapter 2, I offer a reading of Heidegger’s writings bearing on pros hen homonymy (his notes for “Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy” and “Interpretations from Ancient Philosophy” from the Summer Semesters 1926 and 1931 as well as Being and Time itself). I argue that, in its basic thrust, Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomenon agrees with that defended by Shields (1999) and Ward (2008). In Chapter 3, I offer a critical assessment of Shields (1999) and Ward (2008) and I defend an account of pros hen homonymy that hopes to improve on them, distinguished by its employment of the notion of the priority in the causal network (PCN): I argue that PCN explains the centrality of some instances of pros hen homonyms with respect to other instances. In Chapter 4, I outline my ‘post-Aristotelian’ interpretation of Dasein over against the prevailing one, according to which Dasein’s “understanding of Being” somehow determines (instead of being determined by) Being. I argue that such a ‘post-Kantian’ interpretation of Dasein – I focus on Philipse (1998) and Carman (2003) – cannot give Heidegger an answer to the “problem of the unity of Being” without revoking his commitment to OP, and that for this – and several other reasons – we should move beyond it.
The Whole Thing
- “The Structure of Being (in Heidegger’s Being and Time)”
“Ontological pluralism” (OP) – supported today by philosophers such as McDaniel (2009, 2017) and Turner (2010) – claims that ‘being’ (in its existential sense) picks out a number of different features of reality that do not share any common characteristics. But if OP is not a view about these common characteristics – of which, it claims, there are none – then is it a view about anything? McManus (2013) argues that Heidegger – an outspoken historical advocate of OP – failed to address this problem and several related challenges that arise for him from his commitment to OP. However, I argue that Heidegger in fact solves it (as well as some other challenges raised for him by McManus) in Section 4 of his Being and Time, where he claims that the inquiry into Being that he proposes must take the form of an inquiry into “Dasein”: into the kind of being enjoyed by whoever can undertake such an inquiry. On my interpretation, Heidegger takes guidance from Aristotle, who argues in Metaphysics, Gamma 2 that substance is the central modality of Being, to which other modalities are related in the “pros hen” way, and, as such, also the principal object of the “science of being as being.” I argue that what distinguishes Dasein from other kinds of being is its capacity to be affected by Being in all of its diverse modalities (all of which bear on Heidegger’s inquiry into Being that Dasein is said to be able to perform) and that, in like manner, it is the process through which different kinds of being leave their imprint on Dasein (an instance of Aristotle’s formal causation) that holds Heidegger’s conception of Being together as the subject-matter of a single inquiry.
In Chapter 1, I offer an analysis of the challenges to Heidegger’s version of OP raised by McManus (2013), and I answer some of them directly. In Chapter 2, I offer a reading of Heidegger’s writings bearing on pros hen homonymy (his notes for “Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy” and “Interpretations from Ancient Philosophy” from the Summer Semesters 1926 and 1931 as well as Being and Time itself). I argue that, in its basic thrust, Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomenon agrees with that defended by Shields (1999) and Ward (2008). In Chapter 3, I offer a critical assessment of Shields (1999) and Ward (2008) and I defend an account of pros hen homonymy that hopes to improve on them, distinguished by its employment of the notion of the priority in the causal network (PCN): I argue that PCN explains the centrality of some instances of pros hen homonyms with respect to other instances. In Chapter 4, I outline my ‘post-Aristotelian’ interpretation of Dasein over against the prevailing one, according to which Dasein’s “understanding of Being” somehow determines (instead of being determined by) Being. I argue that such a ‘post-Kantian’ interpretation of Dasein – I focus on Philipse (1998) and Carman (2003) – cannot give Heidegger an answer to the “problem of the unity of Being” without revoking his commitment to OP, and that for this – and several other reasons – we should move beyond it.
The Whole Thing