Aristotelian Rhapsody: Did Aristotle Pick His Categories as They Came His Way?

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In the first Critique*, Kant raises two objections against Aristotle's categories. Kant's concern, in the first instance, is whether Aristotle generated all categories that there are and if he did not generate any spurious categories. However, for Kant, this is only a symptom of the second - deeper – flaw in Aristotle's thinking. According to Kant, Aristotle generated his categories 'on no common principle.' This paper develops the two Kantian objections, offers an overview of Brentano's (1862) reconstruction of Aristotle's categories (which claims to have addressed them), develops three objections to this reconstruction, and recommends Trendelenburg (1846) as a better - albeit still flawed – Aristotelian reply to Kant.*

1. Easy Come, Easy Go

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant objects to Aristotle's categories on two grounds. Kant's concern, in the first instance, is whether Aristotle generated all categories that there are and if he did not generate any spurious categories.[1] However, for Kant, this is only a symptom of the second - deeper – flaw in Aristotle's thinking. According to Kant, Aristotle generated his categories 'on no common principle'. He 'merely picked them up as they came his way.'[2] The anxiety whether Kant's objections can be met was alive for the nineteenth-century Aristotle

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[2] *KrV*: A81/B107.

scholarship at large, but, as far as I know, only Brentano claims to have resolved it entirely in Aristotle's favour.[3]

Brentano invokes Aristotle's famous argument that the class of all beings does not constitute a 'γένος'.[4] We shall see that what it takes for a class of objects to constitute a γένος proves to be a contested issue.[5] However, the basic idea here is that nothing can be defined scientifically as a species of the class of cranes, for example, as long as this includes both birds and hoisting machines. Rather, there will be a separate species of cranes-the birds and a separate species of cranes-the machines.[6] By contrast, any class of objects that *could* figure in scientific definitions in this way constitutes a γένος. (Note, though, that this leaves open what exactly a class needs to do to boast this capacity.) According to Aristotle, then, nothing can be defined scientifically as a species of beings.[7] And, according to Brentano, Aristotle generates his categories by dividing the arguably heterogenous class of all beings into classes of decreasing size until the uppermost γένη reveal themselves.[8] (Since, for Aristotle, being is not a γένος, classes corresponding to the uppermost γένη will have fewer members than the class of everything that there is.) The most significant contribution to the Aristotle literature of his doctoral dissertation from 1862, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, consists in an in-

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[3] Cf. Brentano 1981, p. 123.

[4] Cf. *Met*.: III, 3, 998b21–27.

[5] In Section 4.2 below.

[6] Cf. Ward 2008, pp. 168-171. In plainer terms: 'a crane' does not tell us much as an answer to the question 'what is it?' asked of a common crane (*grus grus*) unless we know whether this stands for a bird or for a hoisting machine.

[7] Cf. Czerkawski 2022.

[8] Cf. Brentano 1981, p. 98.

depth reconstruction of this process that purports to show that, just like Kant's own Table of Categories, the Aristotelian list, too, 'has not arisen rhapsodically, as the result of a haphazard search.'[9]

However, with due respect to Brentano as well as to Studtmann (2012, p. 17) who has claimed more recently on behalf of 'a rich tradition of commentators including Radulphus Brito, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas' - and indeed 'their modern heir Franz Brentano'[10] - that they 'provide precisely the kind of derivation for Aristotle's categorical scheme found wanting by Kant,'[11] this paper argues that Brentano's derivation of the categories fails whereas Kant's challenge to Aristotle stands.[12]

Section 2 below presents - and develops - Kant's two objections. Section 3 offers an overview of Brentano's reconstruction of Aristotle's categories. Divided into three subsections, Section 4 advances three objections to this derivation that will attack it at the increasing level of depth, until no step of Brentano's deduction goes through. Section 5 concludes our Aristotelian rhapsody with a recommendation of Trendelenburg (1846) as a more promising, albeit still flawed, Aristotelian response to Kant.

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[9] *KrV*: A81/B106-107.

[10] For Brentano's own account of the genealogy of his interpretation of the origin of the categorial scheme, see Brentano 1981, pp. 118-123.

[11] Cf. Studtmann 2008.

[12] I suspect that the problems I will generate below for Brentano carry over to other names on Studtmann's list – as well as to Studtmann's own reconstruction of Aristotelian categories indebted to them - but the question of whether they do so indeed will have to be left until another occasion.

The three objections to Brentano will be as follows. First, Brentano's proof is deductive only up to a certain – admittedly, late - point, whereupon it transforms into exactly the kind of inductive reasoning Aristotle stands accused of by Kant. Second, due to the absence of a clear criterion for when a class of objects makes up a γένος, either Brentano finds his uppermost γένη already with the first division in the series (of beings in general into substances and accidents) or he has not found them at all, even with the final divisions. Third – and damningly - Brentano fails to rule out an indefinite number of divisions of beings in general alternative to that into substances and accidents that also can be formalised as *F* and not-*F* (such as into universals and particulars,[13] but also into cats and not-cats, dogs and not-dogs, and so forth).

2. Mamma, Oooh

Kant's challenge to Aristotle concludes the section of the argument of the Transcendental Logic known as the 'metaphysical deduction,'[14] charged with identifying 'the elements that pure understanding by itself yields.'[15] What does it take for something, anything, to count as an element of pure understanding? Just as the a priori forms of sensibility covered in the Transcendental Aesthetic – space and time – determine the object of experience insofar as it is sensible, so the elements of pure understanding determine the object of experience insofar as

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[13] Cf. *Cat.*: 2, 1a20.

[14] *KrV*: B159.

[15] *KrV*: A64/B89.

it is *intelligible*.[16] 'Categories' are Kant's term of art for such 'elements' because Kant claims - for reasons he does not disclose - that such was also Aristotle's project in *Categories*.[17]

The metaphysical deduction proceeds from the 'clue', or, literally, the 'guiding thread' (*Leitfaden*) of 'judgment' (*Urteil*). Kant argues that 'the only use which the understanding can make of [its pure] concepts is to judge by means of them.'[18] From this he concludes that the categories (in his specific sense) will amount to those determinations of the objects of experience that make it possible for us to form judgments about these objects.[19] Accordingly, the metaphysical deduction consists in Kant's drawing a 'Table of Judgment' that purports to

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[16] '[T]here may perhaps be concepts which relate *a priori* to objects, not as pure or sensible intuitions, but solely as acts of pure thought […].' *KrV*: A57/B81.

[17] 'These concepts we shall, with Aristotle, call *categories*, for our primary purpose is the same as his, although widely diverging from it in manner of execution.' *KrV*: A79-80/B105.

[18] *KrV*: A68/B93.

[19] I am simplifying Kant's argument considerably. What he says exactly is this: '[t]he same function which gives unity to various representations *in a judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding.' *KrV*: A79/B104-5. For a discussion of some difficulties with this sentence, see Nussbaum 1990. In her influential interpretation of the metaphysical deduction, Longuenesse (2006, p. 142) summarises Kant's reasoning as follows: '[i]f the understanding as a whole is [thus] nothing but a *Vermögen zu urteilen* [the capacity to judge], then identifying the totality of functions […] of the understanding amounts to nothing more and nothing less than identifying the totality of functions present *in judging*, which in turn are manifest by linguistically explicit *forms* of judgments.' Cf. Longuenesse 2001.

present all forms of judgment in a systematic fashion,[20] followed by a structurally homologous 'Table of Categories' that arguably underpin them.[21] Kant claims that this procedure allows us to 'determine in an *a priori* manner their systematic completeness.'[22]

Kant's first objection, that Aristotle's categories are both under- and over-generated, relies on the Table of Categories produced in this fashion. Comparing his Table of Categories against 'Aristotle's list,' Kant finds that, on the one hand, in the latter '[some] of the original concepts […] are entirely lacking' and that, on the other hand,

> there are to be found in it some modes of pure sensibility (*quando*, *ubi*, *situs*, also *prius*, *simul*), and an empirical concept (*motus*), none of which have any place in a table of the concepts that trace their origin to the understanding. Aristotle's list also enumerates among the original concepts some derivative concepts (*action*, *passio*) […]. (*KrV*: A81/B107)[23]

As I understand it, Kant's concern is that Aristotle's supposed account of the understanding excludes some *instances* of intelligibility and includes some *instances* of non-intelligibility – as opposed to excluding and including *general concepts* that range over their respective instances (i.e., categories and non-categories themselves, respectively). Consider that Kant's point, in the latter case, isn't merely that some of Aristotle's categories do not recur in his Table of Categories. This could happen even if '*quando*' (when), for example, *were* an

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[20] Cf. *KrV*: A70/B95.

[21] Cf. *KrV*: A80/B106.

[22] *KrV*: A67/B92.

[23] Note that some of the abovementioned concepts are not the Aristotelian categories proper but pertain to distinctions Aristotle wants to make within some of them. Cf. Studtmann 2012, pp. 65-66.

instance of being intelligible, only conceived with insufficient generality.[24] But instead of merely pointing out that 'quando' is not a category (by the lights of his own table), Kant makes a stronger claim that it is not even an instance of intelligibility (but of sensibility). So, while Aristotle's omission of some genuine categories as well as the readiness to accept their counterfeits would obviously be bad enough – and while Kant's objection, as I understand it, actually entails these two failures - Kant's first objection is at once more severe and more subtle. It is that Aristotle's supposed account of the understanding fails to cover some *instances* of intelligibility and that it covers *non-instances* of intelligibility.

Unfortunately, as things stand, Kant's first objection is very easy to parry even without the help from Brentano - for at least two reasons.

First, it is a prevailing sentiment even among charitably disposed readers of the first *Critique* that the metaphysical deduction of the understanding – from which Kant's first objection draws its force - fails. The most common complaint regards Kant's treatment of the forms of judgments as summarised in his Table of Judgment. Kant offers us no argument for the Table of Judgment, besides asserting that the table does not 'depart […] in any essential respects […] from the technical distinctions ordinarily recognised by logicians.'[25] However, it was not long until logicians took to busily revising these distinctions[26] and this fact was not lost on Kant's readers. 'Even neo-Kantianism,' Heidegger (1997, p. 178) tells his students at a

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[24] For another illustration, any of Aristotle's four causal relations – formal, material, efficient, and final - might arguably be thought to be instances of intelligibility as it is conceived by Kant, for they all seem to be variations on the theme of the category of cause and effect. And yet, they do not figure in Kant's Table of Categories. Cf. *KrV*: A80/B106

[25] *KrV*: A70-1/B95-6.

[26] See especially Lotze 1884.

neo-Kantian stronghold, the University of Marburg, 'was enthusiastic in this critique,' '[t]he result of [which] is that the origin of [the Table of Judgment] is unclear and questionable, as is the deduction of categories from this table.' Furthermore, while an attempt at defending Kant's Table of Judgment has since been made by Wolff (1995), readers of the first *Critique* also worried that, even if one does go along with the Table of Judgment, it may not offer a sufficient support for Kant's Table of Categories.[27] Finally,

> once the Aristotelian model of subject-predicate logic was challenged by post-Fregean truth-functional, extensional logic, it seemed that the whole Kantian enterprise of establishing a table of categories according to the leading thread of forms pertaining to the old logic seemed definitively doomed.[28] (Longuenesse 2006, pp. 152-153)

Second, Kant's understanding of what *Aristotle* means by 'categories' is at best incomplete. In *Metaphysics*, categories explicitly serve Aristotle to articulate the very being of beings (in one of its four senses[29]) rather than merely their intelligibility to us. Consider that the point of Kant's project in the first *Critique* is to set limits on beings to which categories might be legitimately thought to apply – from anything and everything in the dogmatic metaphysics to the objects of sensibility only (excluding God, for example). So, for Kant, there is nothing incoherent about the idea of a being to which no categories apply. For Aristotle, however, this idea is very much incoherent. For, 'being,' Aristotle maintains, is the 'most general concept,'[30] which, as such, will apply to entities whether they are intelligible to us or not. Thus, in spite of what Kant merely asserts in the first *Critique*, he operates with a different

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[27] Cf. Longuenesse 2006, pp. 154-157.

[28] Cf. Longuenesse 2006, pp. 157-161.

[29] Cf. *Met.*: V, 7, 1017a7-1017b9; VI, 2, 1026a33–b2.

[30] *Met.*: III, 4, 1001a21.

concept of a category than Aristotle. But then, one might worry that, even if Kant's Table of Categories were entirely convincing, the disparity between this table and Aristotle's categories could not be counted against the latter. For Kant and Aristotle do not deploy the term 'category' in the same way. Indeed, since each of the two philosophers ultimately tries to account for a different thing, it is to be expected that their lists of categories would differ.

Still, lightly retouched, Kant's first objection can be made compelling, regardless of whether his categories are an improvement on the Aristotelian ones or not. For Kant is surely well within his rights to demand of any account of any determination of philosophical interest – intelligibility, being, or *whatever* – that it covers all instances of this determination and that it does not cover its non-instances. Granted that being is, as Aristotle maintains, the 'most general concept'[31] that second demand will be satisfied trivially by any account of being. For this entails that being – in contrast to intelligibility (at least as Kant conceives of it) – lacks any counterextension for us to worry about. In other words, it cannot be held against any account of being that it applies to any object x. For anything that can be substituted for x - anything that belongs to our domain of discourse at all - *ought to be* covered by our account of being.[32] Still, we are owed some kind of guarantee that there is nothing that does *not* fall under at least one of the categories. For, if there was any such thing, conceiving of it together with objects that do fall under some category would yield a concept that is more general than what the account presents as the concept of being. This means that, until our account is appropriately extended,

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[31] *Met.*: III, 4, 1001a21.

[32] I take it that this includes merely possible objects. I can conceive of some of them as well as of all actual objects. So, if the concept of being applied to actual objects only, it would be less general than the concept of things I can conceive of. But, for Aristotle, being is the most general concept. So, for Aristotle, the concept of being does not apply to actual objects only.

it does not capture all there is to being, after all. And I am sure that most Aristotle scholars would agree that whether Aristotle can indeed offer such a guarantee is a genuine question.

This brings us to Kant's second concern, which is that Aristotle generated his categories 'on no common principle' - he 'merely picked them up as they came his way.'[33] So, is Kant fair to Aristotle? Is he right to claim that there is no principle in Aristotle corresponding to his own that could justify the categories in their ancient shape, demonstrating 'in an *a priori* manner their systematic completeness'[34]?

Actually, although Kant's tone is so inordinately dismissive as to warrant some suspicion, he might be understood to make at least one of the following two points, both of which bear merit. First, Kant might be understood to be picking up on the incontestable fact that there are unexplained minor variations across Aristotle's lists of categories from work to work (and sometimes even across different books of what is generally thought to be the same work)[35] – a complaint that is both legitimate and needing no further explanation. Second, he might be understood to be picking up (in hysterically exaggerated terms) on the evident flaws of any one of the two ways in which, as Ackrill has more recently argued, Aristotle himself appears to suggest one might arrive at his (tenfold) division of categories in *Topics*, Alpha 9 (incidentally, the *only* place in the Aristotelian corpus that uncontroversially hints at the origin

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[33] *KrV*: A81/B107.

[34] *KrV*: A67/B92.

[35] Thus, *Categories* and *Topics* list ten categories, whereas there are only eight in *Posterior Analytics* and *Metaphysics*, Delta and as few as four in *Metaphysics*, Nu. Cf. *Cat.*: IV, 1b25-2a4; *Top.*: I, 9, 103b22; *APo*, I, 22, 83b15; *Met.*: V, 7, 1017a22-30; XIV, 2, 1089b18-25.

of the categories[36]). Let me – very briefly - review these two procedures and make their shortcomings apparent.

The first of Ackrill's recipes for the Aristotelian categories requires us 'to distinguish different questions which may be asked about something and to notice that only a limited range of answers can be appropriately given to any particular question.' For example, '[a]n answer to "where?" could not serve as an answer to "when?"'[37] Furthermore,

> Greek has, as we have not, single-word interrogatives meaning 'of what quality?' and 'of what quantity?' (the abstract nouns 'quality' and 'quantity' were, indeed, invented by philosophers as abstractions from the familiar old interrogatives), and these, too, would normally collect answers from different ranges. (Ackrill 2002, p. 78)

Thus, the first procedure for generating Aristotle's list (suggested by Aristotle's replacing the usual term for substance – 'οὐσία' – with 'τὸ τί ἐστι' meaning 'what it is' in the list of categories he offers at the start of the chapter) consists in listing types of answers that there are to single-word interrogatives in ancient Greek.[38]

The second procedure, suggested by Aristotle's employment of 'τὸ τί ἐστι' as a generic term for any category later in the same chapter of *Topics* (and reverting to 'οὐσία' as a term for substance) involves asking that question of anything at the increasing level of generality (but without reaching the utmost generality reserved by Aristotle for being and one). For example, asking – of a particular cat – what is *this*? – and answering: a cat. Then asking: but

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[36] Cf. Studtmann 2012, p. 67.

[37] Ackrill 2002, p. 78.

[38] For an earlier version of this interpretation, see Brentano 1981, pp. 128-129 (who, in turn, adapts it from Occam).

what is a cat? And answering, for example: an animal. And so on, until we reach substance, in this instance.

Well, it is clear that neither procedure can give us the guarantee sought by Kant.

As we have already realised by comparing, with Ackrill, ancient Greek with contemporary English on the question of quality and quantity, it is a contingent matter how many single word interrogatives there are in any natural language, and, anyway, Ackrill (2002, pp. 78-9) himself observes that 'Aristotle does not have a category corresponding to every one-word Greek interrogative, nor do all of his categories correspond to such interrogatives.' So, it is implausible to think that following the first procedure will yield the complete list of all possible forms of understanding – let alone of being – as such. 'In the end,' as Brentano has already claimed about a version of this interpretation he knows from Occam, 'the entire proof turns into' just what Kant says it is:

> an induction in which language merely facilitates the overview, and many objections can be made against the details as well as the reliability of the result which is derived from the whole. (Brentano 1981, p. 129)

But it is just as implausible to think that the second procedure can have this consequence, either. Suppose that Aristotle followed Ackrill's second procedure to the end - that he compiled a long inventory of everything that there is, glossing each item with the name of a category it belongs to as he went about the compiling. Suppose further that it turned out there were only ten kinds of such glosses (or another number, corresponding to the list of Aristotelian categories we are concerned with). Can we say that he has got them all? Not really. I exist, but (allowing for sufficient departures from what has in fact preceded my birth to make this claim true) I didn't have to. The same applies to entire classes of objects. The world without any relations, for example, seems possible (if messy). And yet, granted our project is to understand what it is to be, even in that world we would still want to be able to say something

about the being of relations - even if none were actually in evidence. For, as long as there is a true sentence to the effect 'Possibly, relations exist,' our concept of existence must somehow accommodate relations (or whatever else takes their place). But if so, basing our categorial analysis on the inventory of all actually existing entities – supposing compiling such a thing is feasible – could not, in principle, guarantee that we have generated all categories. For that, our inventory would also need to include entities about which the most that can be said is just that they *could* exist.

Still, it is one thing to concede that Aristotle fails to meet the second demand and another to concede that it is, indeed, a *reasonable* demand. So, why, in generating an account of some unknown determination, should Aristotle – or anyone else for that matter – proceed in an a priori fashion from a 'common principle' like Kant's '*Leitfaden*' of judgment? Maybe a different kind of procedure would be good enough. Kant gives us two reasons - both, I will now argue, compelling.

Kant's first reason is just that 'the complete enumeration of [pure concepts], as based on induction only, could never be guaranteed.'[39] Although Kant leaves this claim unargued for, it is effectively borne out by our earlier consideration that the question of what it is to be – as well as Kant's question of what it is to be understood – isn't merely concerned with what transpires in the actual world. It is, rather, concerned with all that *could* be (or could be understood) at large. And only approaching these concerns from the a priori vantage point can promise to give us the complete enumerations of the relevant concepts. Induction, as Kant rightly claims, just won't do - inasmuch as it does not look beyond the actual world, inasmuch as it does not look at what's possible at large.

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[39] *KrV*: A81/B106-107. Cf. *KrV*: A66/B91.

The second reason is that proceeding in an a priori fashion has, indeed, *intrinsic* value. In searching for an account of an unknown determination such as intelligibility or being, we are searching for an *explanation* of that determination rather just for any random list of concepts whose extension is the same as that of the *explanandum*. ('Nor could we, if this were our procedure, discover why just these concepts, and no others, have their seat in the pure understanding.'[40]) Thus, I can divide all beings into (1) triangles, (2) flying pigs, (3) Aristotle's right ear, and (4) objects that are neither triangles nor flying pigs nor Aristotle's right ear. There is no being that one of these concepts would not pick up (due mainly to the plasticity of the fourth one). But it is a stretch to say that they illuminate being any more than Aristotle's claim from *Metaphysics* that 'being is the most general concept.'[41] Indeed, it is thanks to our putative acceptance of this claim that we can say that (1), (2), (3), and (4) have jointly the same extension as being. By contrast, we can, I think, easily recognise in Kant's Table of Categories the *sort of thing* we are asking for when we ask about the intelligibility of the objects of experience. For, Kant's categories are really a development of the following insight (that, in itself, owes nothing to his Table of Judgment in its actual shape): for something, anything, to be intelligible is just for that thing to be a possible object of judgment. Thus, Kant goes beyond the dreary accountancy of ensuring that *explanandum* is extensionally equal to *explanans*. He explains – or at least genuinely tries to - why concepts on the side of *explanans* are divided in the way they are rather than in any random way.

Thus, both Kant's demands underpinning his two objections to Aristotle – (i) to show that our *explanans* is complete and free of redundancy and (ii) to specify the single principle by which it can be generated in an a priori fashion, which guarantees these achievements as

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[40] *KrV*: A81/B107.

[41] *Met.*: III, 4, 1001a21.

well as plays an additional explanatory role - are well-founded. And, if Ackrill's plausible reading of *Topics*, Alpha 9 was all the Aristotelian could offer in response to Kant, Aristotle's categories would manifestly fail to satisfy either.

3. Spare Him His Life from This Monstrosity

Brentano thinks, however, that there is more to Aristotle's categories than *Topics*, Alpha 9 alone might suggest. According to Brentano, even if Ackrill's recipes did give us Aristotle's list, this could be no more than a lucky coincidence. For Aristotle's generative process proper is deductive through and through. It consists in dividing beings (which do not, as argues Aristotle, constitute a γένος) into classes of decreasing size until the uppermost γένη reveal themselves. Thus, the task Brentano sets for himself in the core part of his dissertation is to find 'the path required to reach generic determinations in the classification of being [*on*] as equivocal but analogical.'[42] (A concept is 'analogical' in Brentano's sense if objects it covers do not make a single γένος, but are still substantively related to each other in another way.[43])[44] Our own task now will be to retrace that path.

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[42] Brentano 1981, p. 98.

[43] There are actually two ways in which this may happen. See Brentano 1981, pp. 58-66.

[44] In his recent article on the same subject, Raspa (2021, p. 196) claims that, 'following Bonitz, Brentano interprets being as a supreme genus and on that basis provides a deduction of the categories.' However, this claim stands on an ungenerous – and extremely implausible – reading of the remark Brentano (1981, p. 96) makes about *Metaphysics*, Gamma 2: 'Here again [Aristotle] speaks of the kinds [*Arten*] of being and the corresponding kinds of the one as if being were a genus [*nicht anders als ob das Seiende eine Gattung wäre*]; and these so-called kinds [*diese sogenannten Arten*] are, of course, the categories.' (Cf. Brentano 1862, p. 147; Respa 2021, p. 194.) *As if*. *So-called*. These remarks are part of Brentano's discussion of the

Brentano begins by noting that Aristotle's categorial scheme seems to overlap with another division of beings he offers in *Categories* – between beings that are 'in a subject' and beings that are 'not in a subject' - that, together with the division of beings into 'said of' and 'not said of', make up the first – fourfold – division of beings on offer in *Categories*.[45] '(By "in a subject" I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.)'[46] In fact, on Brentano's reading, objects that are not in a subject are the same as substances from the tenfold division, whereas objects that are in a subject – συμβεβηκός or accidents – are the same as the objects the remaining nine categories range over. Brentano's ingenuous claim is that Aristotle's division of everything into objects 'in a subject' and 'not in a subject' in Chapter 2 of *Categories* in fact corresponds to the *first step* of Aristotle's

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famous passage in *Metaphysics*, Gamma 2 where Aristotle argues that, even though being is homonymous – i.e., objects the corresponding term picks out do not belong in any single γένος – they are still sufficiently unified to be addressed by a single science. Since, for Aristotle, the subject-matter of a single science normally forms a γένος, Brentano is free to make an entirely uncontroversial point that beings in Aristotle's categorial sense enjoy γένος-*like* unity, which, as we have just noted, he ultimately analyses in terms of the concept of 'analogy'. Nothing in Brentano's texts suggests that he misunderstands Aristotle on this basic point. I am also wondering how much sense Respa can make of the passage I have excerpted above and why, on his interpretation, Brentano's divisions stop when they do – why does he stop at substances, for example, but not at accidents?

[45] Cf. *Cat.*: 2, 1a20.

[46] *Cat.*: 2, 1a20.

deduction of the categories. This first step produces one genuine γένος, substance,[47] and another concept disguising - like being itself - a multiplicity of γένη: accident ('[*symbebekos*] itself is only one by analogy […] which will again divide into several classes depending on the manner in which it is predicated of primary substance'[48]).

Here, then, is the *second step* of Brentano's proof, which, like the first one, yields one γένος and a further class held together only by analogy. Thus, the accident, and, that is to say, 'whatever can be asserted of the subject, without itself being the subject, can be attributed to it either absolutely or merely in relation to another.'[49] Beings 'asserted of the subject […] merely in relation to another' give us the category of relation (πρός τι), whereas those asserted 'absolutely' make up a heterogenous bundle, for which, argues Brentano, the Aristotelian term of art is 'πάθη' - affections.[50] For the distinguishing mark of πάθη is just that they 'properly affect the substance.'[51] By contrast, relations 'are only loosely tied to the subject and merely touch it without modifying it.'[52]

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[47] '[F]urther real divisions of substance […] will have to take the form of divisions of a univocal concept through added differentiae [*diaphorai*] in the manner of a specification in the narrower sense.' Brentano 1981, p. 98. Brentano conflates – not unproblematically - univocity with the possession of a γένος. Cf. Loux 1973.

[48] Brentano 1981, p. 99.

[49] Brentano 1981, p. 99.

[50] Cf. 'These absolute accidents also do not all seem to be predicated of substance in the same way.' Brentano 1981, p. 100. I should note that Brentano recognises other technical uses of the term 'πάθη' in Aristotle. Cf. Brentano 1981, p. 100.

[51] Brentano 1981, p. 99.

[52] Brentano 1981, p. 99.

The *third step* does not produce *any* γένη. The first class that it does produce – that looks a lot like, but really isn't, a kind of affection (for affection in the relevant sense does not constitute a single γένος) – is that of 'inherence [*eneinai*] in the proper sense':

This is the case which comes closest to the relation between substantial form and primary matter [*prote hyle*]. These accidents, as for example, color, extension, etc., can be called *inherences.* (Brentano 1981, p. 101)

The second merely analogous concept is of 'those [beings] that are in something [*ta en tini*]' - Brentano sometimes renders these as 'circumstances.' An accident is a circumstance

if [it] exists initially altogether outside the subject, as for example place is outside of that which is in the place, so that the subject, for some special reason, is externally determined by it […]. (Brentano 1981, p. 101)

Third and finally,

'if the predicate derives partly from within and partly from without, as when it is to the subject not as form is to matter but as activity is to the potency which it actualizes, then it should be called an operation or, to use Aristotle's expression, a movement [*kinesis*]. (Brentano 1981, p. 101)

The *fourth step* – on which I will not dwell here, even though it makes up the largest part of Brentano's proof – is the one in which Brentano divides each pseudo-species of πάθη into the remaining categories proper. Thus, inherents above disguise the γένη of quantity and

quality;[53] circumstances break down into the γένη of where (ποῦ) and when (πότε),[54] and operations, finally, are really either actions (ποιεῖν) or affections (πάσχειν).[55]

And so Brentano completes his deduction of Aristotle's categories. For, although for Aristotle of *Categories* and *Topics* circumstances and operations would also include, respectively, the categories of posture (κεῖσθαι) and of having (ἔχειν), Aristotle of *Posterior Analytics* and *Metaphysics* seems to have come to the conclusion that these two can be subsumed under the preceding eight categories, after all - according to Brentano, for all the right reasons (which I cannot explore here[56]).

4. No, We Will Not Let You Go!

Unfortunately for Brentano and Aristotle, this reconstruction does not work – at least as a response to Kant. The plan for this section is to develop three systematic difficulties I have with Brentano's proof in the order of increasing gravity (as measured by the steps I will challenge: from the last, leaving most of the proof in a good shape, to the first one, leaving none of it intact).

4.1. A Deduction? (Let Me Go!)

Thus, my first – and the least serious concern – is that, in the fourth step of the proof, Brentano loses his claim on the completeness of the Aristotelian division. This claim is fully justified at the first step of the proof, where Brentano's Aristotle divides everything into substances and accidents. For this amounts to a division of everything into what is in the subject and what is not in the subject; and, at least in classical logic, the claim that anything is either *F* or not *F*

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[53] Brentano 1981, pp. 101-103.

[54] Brentano 1981, pp. 109-114.

[55] Brentano 1981, pp. 103-104.

[56] But see Brentano 1981, pp. 107-112.

comes out true regardless of what gets substituted for F. I am ready to concede the same thing about the second step, dividing accidents into relations and affections inasmuch as these, again, mark the presence or the absence of the same characteristic (either 'properly affect[ing] the substance' or 'merely touch[ing] [the substance] without modifying it'[57]), as well as about the third step, where the formal structure of Brentano's division of affections is as follows: (1) F, (2) not-F, and (3) partly-F and partly-not-F. However, in the fourth step of the proof Brentano indulges in exactly the kind of wild brainstorming that Aristotle stands accused of by Kant.

The most flagrant case of this – and certainly the first one that would flash red for Kant – is Brentano's division of circumstances into where and when. Brentano (1981, p. 110) asserts here that 'the addition of a new class of circumstances does not seem conceivable.' While this might be true, the alleged absence of any other class of circumstances has not been established by appealing to logical principles alone, which is what Brentano needs to do in order for his proof to qualify as a deduction. Consider that time and space cannot be formalised as F and not F – at any rate, Brentano gives us no clue about how this might be accomplished. Thus, as far as we know, it might be that it is only due to our cognitive limitations that beings show up in time and space as opposed to other circumstances, unknown to us. The same applies to Brentano's division of operations into potentiality and actuality as well as his division of inherences into quality and quantity. Just like with time and space, they are not negations of each other in a way substances and non-substances, and internal and non-internal determinations of substances are. Even if it is true that any operation that is not a potentiality must then be an actuality (and *vice versa*)*,* and if it is true that any inherence that is a quality must then be a quantity (and *vice versa*), this has not been established by Brentano by appealing to logical principles alone. Thus, his claim of completeness of the Aristotelian division stands

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[57] Brentano 1981, p. 99.

only up to the third step of his deduction, from which point onwards it stops being a deduction in any other than aspirational sense.[58]

4.2. Why Not Just Two Categories? (Let Me Go!)

While this leaves most of Brentano's proof in a good shape, my second systematic concern affects it from the second step onwards. Disappointingly – considering his overall strategy - Brentano lacks an explicit criterion for when to affirm that some class of objects makes up a γένος (and so, it's time to stop) and when to deny this (and so, we need to carry on dividing). Recall that, to his credit, at each step of the proof Brentano provides us with some distinguishing characteristic of each and every class under consideration regardless of whether he will affirm that it is a γένος or not. Thus, he says of the supposed heterogenous concept of accidents that they are 'in the subject;' of the supposed heterogenous concept of affections that

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[58] One might think that Brentano's procedure forces him, so to speak, to conclude his deduction with a flourish of inductive brainstorming and that therein lies an even greater flaw of his approach. It might seem that, if Brentano were to work only by identifying purely logical distinctions between *F* and not *F* (and, in one case, partly *F* and partly not-*F*), then there will be always something that does not fall under a γένος, but is simply characterised negatively as 'not something'. If so, the real problem with Brentano's derivation isn't that it in fact ends on inductive note, but that it condemns itself to doing so on pain of never finishing its divisions. To this graver charge, however, Brentano has a good reply, I think. Conceptualising something as 'not something' surely does not preclude its positive characterisation. The sexual difference has two poles, so we can conceptualise male as not-female and female as not-male. But this does not mean the biologist can only offer a positive characterisation of one of these poles and treat the other derivatively. Both are independent objects of scientific study and thus allow for positive characterisation. So, it seems to me that Brentano's approach survives this objection.

they 'properly affect the substance,'[59] and so on for each pseudo-species of affections at the third step of the proof. But, standardly, we take the presence of such a distinguishing characteristic as both necessary and sufficient for a γένος. Thus, healthiness, for example, does not make up a γένος, according to Aristotle, because it seems impossible to find one characteristic that will describe all kinds of healthiness (including healthiness of a body, of a diet or an exercise, and of a complexion).[60] So, on this standard understanding for what it takes for a class of objects to constitute a γένος, Brentano already finds his highest γένη at the first step of his proof. They are substances and accidents. There is no reason to keep generating any more categories.

Note that Brentano's predicament here is, in fact, quite deep. For suppose that Brentano chooses to contest the standard understanding of γένος and that he strengthens it with some necessary conditions that are not satisfied by his alleged heterogenous concepts. But then, it would not be immediately clear from what he says in *On the Several Senses* whether they are actually satisfied by his supposed γένη, either. So, in that case, the work that his deductive proof from its first step onwards was supposed to do would still need doing.[61]

4.3. Alternative Divisions (Let Me Go!)

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[59] Brentano 1981, p. 99.

[60] Cf. *Met.*: IV, 2, 1003a34-1003b6.

[61] One might think that Brentano's failure to offer an explicit definition of a γένος affects all steps of his proof (given his general approach) rather than, as I propose, merely the second one and the remainder. But it seems to me that nothing stops Brentano from explaining that the standard understanding of a γένος above has been implied all along, and us - from accepting this explanation.

Unfortunately, I am not persuaded that developing Brentano's argument in this way would give the Aristotelian a satisfactory reply to Kant (even forgetting about my first objection). For – and this is my most serious concern – I do not think that even the first step, the division of all beings into substances and accidents, is sound. While, as I have conceded, the first division easily ticks the completeness box (as it effectively divides everything into Fs and not-Fs), it does not in the least explain why should we make this particular F – being 'in a subject' – the axis of our division of beings, and that is to say, it does not satisfy Kant's second demand, which I have defended in Section 2. Why not divide everything into (1) triangles, (2) flying pigs, (3) Aristotle's right ear, and (4) objects that are neither triangles nor flying pigs nor Aristotle's right ear, which division, I argued there, also satisfies completeness? Or, for a less contrived example, why not divide everything by the other axis of the fourfold division from *Categories* – 'said of' and not 'said of' – giving us universals and particulars, respectively?

Regrettably, what Brentano has to offer here is extremely thin:

This difference between substance [*ousia*] and accident [*symbebekos*] is greater than any difference that can occur between accidents. It is the most obvious and is therefore justly placed at the beginning. (Brentano 1981, p. 98)

Thus, according to Brentano, two features distinguish the first division from alternative divisions. First, the difference it generates is 'greater than any difference that can occur between accidents,' and, second, it is the 'most obvious.' This second supposed distinction can be dismissed immediately as that is precisely what is under dispute. As for the first one, while my impression is that, by it, Brentano does not actually mean much, I now want to develop some challenges to what strikes me as its most natural reconstruction.

Brentano's proposal, on the construal that strikes me as most natural, is simply that the number of objects in the extension of accidents is necessarily[62] smaller than the number of objects in the extension of substances. To illustrate, imagine a possible world W consisting entirely of two cats - one black and one white – and two dogs: each neither black nor white. At W, the difference between dogs and cats is greater than the difference between blackness and whiteness. For, whereas there are two instances of dog-making features and, likewise, two instances of cat-making features at W, there is only one instance of black-making and only one instance of white-making features at W. Now imagine that this proportion is preserved across all possible worlds. On its natural reconstruction, Brentano's distinction between substances and accidents and distinctions between classes of accidents are respectively like distinctions between dogs and cats and black and white things in my contrived scenario.[63]

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[62] 'that *can* occur'

[63] An anonymous reviewer of this paper proposed to me that a 'qualitative' interpretation of Brentano's claim above is more plausible than the 'quantitative' one I have just offered. The reviewer phrases the qualitative interpretation as follows: 'there is more of a difference between any substance and any accident than there is between any two accidents.' I have two things to say about this (besides reiterating my own – opposed – judgment). First, I'm not sure if the alternative is genuinely qualitative. For, as long as we want to say that there is *more* of something here than there, we are surely invoking quantities. It is true that these need not be, as I propose, quantities of concrete objects themselves. They could also be quantities of parts of concrete objects (in a way an apple, for example, could enjoy more redness than another or the couple of Romeo and Juliet could be more in love than the former couple of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie). Still, they would be quantities no less. Second, I believe that, insofar as quantities are involved, a version of each of my three objections could be formulated for the

Unfortunately, if such was indeed Brentano's justification for embracing the division of beings into substances and accidents rather than any of the alternative divisions, it suffers from three obvious shortcomings.

First, the division of beings into substances and accidents does not compete with 'any difference that can occur between accidents' but with an indefinite number of alternative divisions of beings. So, what Brentano needs to show is not that '[t]his difference between substance [*ousia*] and accident [*symbebekos*] is greater than any difference that can occur between accidents' (note though that he does not actually show this). What he needs to show to get the asymmetry he wants is that it is greater than differences between all other pairs of *F*s and not-*F*s.

Second, we know for sure that Brentano cannot, in fact, show this. It is an analytic truth that the number of all objects that there are and could be will remain the same however we may divide them. Of course, the more we divide, the less pronounced the differences between them will be. So, there is a greater difference between cats and not-cats than there is between cats and dogs. But the magnitude of difference is equal for cats and not-cats and for dogs and not-dogs. And, indeed, for substances and accidents. So, on the natural reconstruction of Brentano's

reviewer's variant, too. However, while my objections 1 and 3 transfer rather easily, the translation of the second objection would take up a lot of additional space, making this paper unnecessarily long and technical. Note that difference in the relevant sense is a relational property like being in love above (predicated of tuples rather than of individuals) rather than a simple property like redness above. So, spelling out what it might actually amount to – i.e., what kind of relational property it is - would require some formal machinery. And spelling out the new variant of the objection would involve a lot of clunkiness.

remark above, Brentano cannot rule out an indefinite number of divisions of beings that are as crude as the division of beings into substances and accidents.

Third and finally, while Aristotle might agree with Brentano that the 'difference between substance [*ousia*] and accident [*symbebekos*]' is more fundamental than 'any difference that can occur between accidents,' it is implausible to think that Aristotle would agree that it is more fundamental than all differences that can occur between beings in general. Recall that Aristotle introduces this difference alongside the difference between universals and particulars that jointly make the first, fourfold division, of *Categories*, presenting them as being of equal philosophical importance. So, the worry is not just that Brentano fails to safeguard Aristotle's categories from Kant's objections, but that, in so doing, he ascribes to Aristotle a view the latter would not endorse for independent reasons.

We may conclude, therefore, that, like Ackrill, Brentano is manifestly unable to block the tandem of Kant's objections. He can, of course, guarantee the completeness of his first division - of beings into substances and accidents. But so can I guarantee the completeness of a division of beings into Aristotle's right ear and beings that are distinct from it. So what?

5. No Escape from Reality

Unfortunately, I am unable to think of any recipe for Aristotle's categories that could survive Kantian scrutiny. This is disappointing, as it would be nice to see that a conceptual scheme that is such a prominent part of our philosophical DNA is a fruit of some undefeatable reasoning. I am afraid that, probably, it is not. Still, I believe that a much more satisfying account of where Aristotle's categories come from has already been provided by Brentano's one-time teacher in Berlin, Trendelenburg. I believe that it is more satisfying because, unlike Brentano above, Trendelenburg does make an earnest attempt to reply to the second of Kant's objections. Thus, I want to conclude with a brief review of that account (as he presents it in his *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*) and of its attendant concern (that was sufficiently acknowledged by

Trendelenburg himself), as well as with a proposal of my own that Trendelenburg's account actually ties in nicely with Ackrill's interpretation of *Topics*, Alpha 9, and so, is substantially more exegetically convincing than Trendelenburg's contemporaries – *excluding* Brentano who actually liked it[64] - have thought.[65]

On Trendelenburg's proposal – as incredible as it is electrifying - Kant's appeal to the *Leitfaden* of judgment unwittingly repeats Aristotle's own procedure, which was to glean the categories from the structures inherent in the close relative of judgment as Kant uses this term (i.e., more or less interchangeably with a proposition) – a sentence (*Satze*).[66] Thus, Trendelenburg speaks here of a '*grammatische Leitfaden*'[67] – that is to say, of a grammatical guiding-thread.

Key to (though far from only evidence for) this claim is Trendelenburg's interpretation of the long sentence in which Aristotle introduces his tenfold division in Chapter 4 of *Categories*: 'Of things said without any combination, each signifies… [the list of categories ensues, followed by examples].'[68] Aristotle's Greek for Ackrill's 'combination' is 'συμπλοχήν' and this, argues Trendelenburg, 'is already in Plato a recurrent expression for the sentential bond [*Satzverbindung*]' (i.e., the connection between words in a sentence):

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[64] Brentano's (1981) concern with what follows – beyond what Trendelenburg notes himself - is just that it's not the whole story.

[65] See especially Bonitz 1853.

[66] For the place of '*Urteil*' and '*Satze*' in Aristotle's thinking, see Chapter 5 of Trendelenburg 1846 (pp. 13-18).

[67] Cf. Trendelenburg 1846, pp. 25, 33, 180, 216.

[68] *Cat.*: 4, 1b25.

> Just as συμπλοχήν is used for the intertwining of opposites […] so it is found especially where name and what is said about its bearer (*Aussage*), subject and predicate, come together (*verbinden*) […]. (Trendelenburg 1846, pp. 11-12)[69]

But if the sentence in question employs 'συμπλοχήν' in the sense of a sentential bond, Aristotle might be thought to hint thereby at the origin of the categorial scheme. Namely, at the fact that, as Trendelenburg observes, one thing that '[a]ll ten categories have in common' is 'that they become manifest (*ausgesprochen*) outside of the sentential bond.'[70]

Still, what remains from a sentence once we remove the sentential bond are surely *words* rather than determinations of objects. Classified with respect to the function they play in a sentence, they will yield parts of speech like nouns, verbs, and so on, rather than determinations of objects such as (presumably) the categories. So, is Trendelenburg's claim – as Benveniste's will be in his influential essay – that the Aristotelian categories are really just parts of speech in disguise?[71] Not really. It is, as we anticipated, that parts of speech are, for Aristotle, *indices* of the categories in the same way Kant takes the Table of Judgment as an index of the Table of Categories (taking the Stoic division of parts of speech as an approximation of the conception thereof that could be enjoyed by Aristotle[72]).

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[69] All translations from *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* are mine.

[70] Trendelenburg 1846, p. 12. For more textual evidence for Trendelenburg's grammatical interpretation see Trendelenburg 1846, pp. 24-33. For a range of interesting objections, see Bonitz 1853, and, for some responses, Brentano 1981, pp. 126-128.

[71] Cf. '[Aristotle] thought he was defining the attributes of objects but he was really setting up linguistic entities; it is the language which, thanks to its own categories, makes them to be recognised and specified.' Benveniste 1971, p. 61.

[72] Cf. Trendelenburg 1846, p. 23.

Thus,

> The οὐσία [substance] corresponds to the noun, and the ποσόν [quantity] and ποιόν [quality] to the adjective (which can also be expressed by the numeral word denoting a real characteristic [as in Aristotle's two examples of ποσόν in *Categories*: 'four-foot, five-foot']). The πρός τι [relation] has a wider meaning than the correspondence to the relative comparative would suggest; but it clearly bears the marks of grammatical consideration […]. The ποῦ [place] and πότε [time] are portrayed by the adverbs of place and time. The last four categories are linked to the verb: ποιεῖν [action] and πάσχειν [passion] to its active and passive forms, κεῖσθαι [being-in-a-position] to at least a part of the intransitives, and ἔχειν [having] […] to the peculiarity of the Greek perfect when this indicates a possession of an effect. (Trendelenburg 1846, pp. 23-24)

Hence, on Trendelenburg's reading, Aristotle's categories demonstrate the sort of systematic unity that was found wanting by Kant. Just as the coherence of Kant's Table of Categories was guaranteed by the (alleged) coherence of his Table of Judgment, so the coherence of the Aristotelian categories is guaranteed by the systematic connection between different parts of speech. As Trendelenburg (1846, p. 12) puts it, 'the sentence is a whole' in a sense that individual parts of speech 'have their measure in the sentential bond': 'they are not to be understood if this is not understood.' So, as long as a convincing defence of the generative principle underpinning the systematic unity enjoyed by the Aristotelian categories therewith could indeed be mounted, it looks like the second of Kant's objections could be blocked, after all. And, since, by Kant's own lights, proceeding from a common (correct) principle is sufficient for completeness and the lack of redundancy, it follows that so could the first one. So, can Trendelenburg mount such a defence on Aristotle's behalf?

As I anticipated, even Trendelenburg does not actually believe that his '*grammatische Leitfaden*' is really up to the task. For, it is, of course, a contingent matter what grammatical

forms there are in any natural language – contingent on our biology, culture, and so on.[73] There is no good reason to think that the pure structures of intelligibility – let alone of being as such - could be fixed in relation to one natural language among others.[74] Of course, considering Aristotle's realist assumptions about the world and our knowledge thereof, it is natural for him to think of any natural language as a repository of forms that the world itself has once impressed upon us, and so, as a reliable clue to what categories there are. Still, this blatantly falls short of Kant's demands[75] – and Trendelenburg beats his subsequent critics to first making this point:

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[73] One might object that any evidence for Chomsky's theory of universal grammar is at the same time evidence against this claim. But Chomsky does not seem to deny that this universal grammar is contingent on our biology (he claims that it is *innate*, but 'innate' falls short of 'necessary for language' – it falls short of saying that, had our biology been a little different in the relevant respect, we would no longer be speaking a language). Nor does he seem to think that this universal grammar (hence, our shared biology) completely determines the shape of any natural language. If it did, whence the variation among the natural languages? Cf. Chomsky 1986.

[74] In the words of Brentano (1981, p. 123), 'a procedure which… has to rely on mere agreement with grammatical relations cannot escape being reproached for its superficiality.'

[75] An interesting question to consider here, though, is whether, at the end of the day, Kant's metaphysical deduction does not meet the same fate. Frege (1967) would certainly argue that it does. For Frege, as his view is reconstructed by Longuenesse (2006, p. 158), 'Kant's subservience to the traditional, Aristotelian model of subject-predicate logic is grounded on [a] confusion. For the subject-predicate model really takes its cue from the grammatical structure of sentences in ordinary language [which typically have a subject and a predicate]. And ordinary language is itself governed by the subjective, psychological intentions and

If it has become probable to us from some indications that, in order to determine the most general predicates, Aristotle in fact followed […] a grammatical guiding-thread of the decomposition of the sentence, we still have no more than a guiding-thread, a general comprehensive point of view, and we remain uncertain about questions which are of great importance both for the subject-matter and for Aristotle's own way of looking at things. For, we do not learn how Aristotle came to stitch together precisely these ten and no other concepts, and no more and no less. If we sought to illuminate this dark place by comparing them with the parts of speech, this was more of our own consideration and we missed the exact grounds. (Trendelenburg 1846, p. 180)

Thus, whilst, at least to me, the ingenuity of Trendelenburg's interpretation of the origin of Aristotle's categories is simply astounding, he does not overstate his case, like, as I hope to have shown in Section 4, his most able intellectual successor soon will.

Finally, I am inclined to regard Trendelenburg's account as more exegetically compelling than is typically recognised. Even if, as already Bonitz (1853) has shown, none of Trendelenburg's textual evidence for his reading is closed to other interpretations, there is, I think, an important connection between Trendelenburg's *Leitfaden*-reading and Ackrill's first interrogative procedure (generally accepted as capturing at least a part of Aristotle's thinking

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associations of the speaker addressing a listener. But […] what matters to logic are the structures of thought that are relevant to valid inference, nothing else. Those structures, for Frege, include the logical constants of propositional calculus (negation and the conditional), the analysis of propositions into function-argument rather than subject-predicate, and quantification.' Thus, for Frege, Kant's own *Leitfaden* is hardly any less grammatical than the one Trendelenburg finds in Aristotle. It just focusses on a different aspect of the grammar of a natural language.

on the subject). While this does not work so well for English, in natural languages more abundant in single-word interrogatives such as ancient Greek, parts of speech can be roughly distinguished by single-word questions to which they can serve as answers. As in, to 'what' there correspond nouns, to 'when' and 'where', adverbs of time and place – and this, I am afraid, might be it (for English). In fact, that is just how the author of this essay learned about parts of speech in a Polish elementary school a very long time ago. So, in fact, any evidence for Ackrill's seemingly uncontroversial interpretation serves at the same time as evidence for Trendelenburg's seemingly controversial interpretation.

Therefore, while Kant's systematic objections to Aristotle remain in force, his claim that Aristotle 'merely picked [his categories] as they came his way' – if taken to mean anything more than Aristotle's evident failure to meet his second demand - is not just ungenerous but false.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

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APo   *Posterior Analytics*

Cat.   *Categories*

Met.   *Metaphysics*

Top.   *Topics*

(In all cases, I relied on translations from Clarendon Aristotle Series.)

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