

‘The Soul Is, in a Way, All Beings’: Heidegger’s Debts to Aristotle in *Being and Time*

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This paper develops a novel interpretation of Dasein, as we find it in Heidegger’s Being and Time. On this interpretation, Heidegger models this most famous of all his concepts after Aristotle’s account of the soul from De Anima as isomorphic with whatever it currently cognises. Indeed, Dasein proves central to the inquiry into Being he attempts in that book precisely because, like soul, it is capable of becoming like all beings.

1. Introduction

In Chapter 8 of Book Gamma of *De Anima* (hereafter DA), Aristotle argues for the following *striking claim* (SC):

SC: ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα. [The soul is, in a way, all beings.] (DA: III, 8, 431b21)¹

¹ This paper is based on my DPhil thesis, and so my thanks are due to great many people who helped me with that project in various ways. But I especially wish to thank its supervisors and my mentors - Stephen Mulhall and Michail Peramatzis - as well as Mark Wrathall and Denis McManus, who examined the thesis and gave me a lot to think about: it took me a full year since our meeting to know what to do with the thesis and to initiate the process of converting it into the present article. I also wish to express my gratitude to University College in Oxford for funding my doctoral work and for providing me with a very stimulating environment to conduct it, as well as to the trustees of the Philosophical Fellowship Fund at the University of Oxford, the grant from which made the thesis-to-article conversion possible.

The argument recalls one of the tenets of Aristotle's philosophy of cognition (argued for in the preceding chapters and books of *DA*) that what it takes for a soul to cognise an instance of *F*, whether in perception (*αἴσθησις*) or in thought (*νόησις*), is for a soul to *itself* instantiate *F* in some way. Combine this with Aristotle's claim that the soul can cognise anything and everything – for, or so he now argues, anything and everything is either a possible object of perception or a possible object of thought – and it will follow that the soul can also instantiate 'all beings.'²

But SC must not be misunderstood: 'in a way' (*πώς*) makes room for Aristotle to quickly qualify this as a matter of the soul's coming to share the form of the object of cognition; not of becoming numerically identical with it.³ Simply put, the Aristotelian soul does not *fuse* with the cognised object, as it were. It becomes *like* it.⁴

More, without doubt, needs to be said about SC, as there is now a booming industry dedicated to the notion of likeness at work here.⁵ However, my primary concern in what follows isn't really with Aristotle exegesis. It is, rather, with a curious – and, what is even more curious, generally neglected – reappearance of SC in another entry in the canon of Western philosophy, more than two millennia its junior: Heidegger's *Being and Time* (hereafter *BT*).

² In fact, for Aristotle, this ability could be sustained by the faculty of thought alone, of which he says earlier that "it thinks all beings." *DA*: III, 4, 429a18.

³ Cf. "It is necessary that [the soul's perceptual faculty and faculty of knowledge] be either these things themselves or their forms. It is certainly not the things themselves..." *DA*: III, 8, 431b30-31.

⁴ Cf. *DA*: II, 5, 418a3-6; II, 12, 424a17-23; Shields 2016, p. xxxiv.

⁵ See Caston 2005 for an excellent map of the terrain (and a defense of an original position).

SC turns up (though it loses ‘πάντα’ – ‘all’ – in the transfer) at a turning point in the argument of *BT*, right after Heidegger has argued that the ancient inquiry into Being he wants to revive in that book must assume the shape of an inquiry into ‘Dasein’, and that is to say, into a kind of being distinguished by its ‘understanding of Being’ (*Seinsverständnis*) and exemplified by us.⁶ Heidegger now claims that, in fact, the ‘priority’ of Dasein underpinning this methodological proposal

was seen quite early, though Dasein itself was not grasped in its genuine ontological structure, and did not even become a problem in which this structure was sought. Aristotle says: ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἔστι. The soul (of man) is, in a certain way, beings. The “soul,” which makes up the Being of man, discovers (in its ways of being: αἴσθησις and νόησις) all beings with regard to that and what they are – that is to say, always in their Being. (SZ: 14 [4])⁷

(The remainder of the paragraph is concerned with the appropriation of Aristotelian philosophy of cognition by Aquinas and with reassuring us that the ‘priority of Dasein’ – as Aristotle,

⁶ I need to keep this brief: ‘Dasein’ refers (by stipulation) to anyone who can raise the question of Being (SZ: 7 [2]). An ‘understanding of Being’ is what it takes to raise this question (SZ: 5 [2]), and so, it is essential for Dasein (SZ: 12 [4]). We raise this question. So, we exemplify both Dasein and its understanding of Being (SZ: 5 [2]).

⁷ The first of a few occasions in this paper, where I deviate from Macquarrie in Robinson in a significant way: their version of the passage suggests that Heidegger is offering a *translation* of SC. But, although Heidegger reproduces here a few words from the Greek version of SC in German, what he is offering instead is a *gloss* on this claim, as my own version of the passage hopes to make clear. (As translation, this would grossly inadequate: there is no ‘of man’ in the Greek text.)

Aquinas, and Heidegger himself saw it - ‘has nothing in common with a vicious subjectivizing of the totality of beings.’⁸)

This paper develops a novel interpretation of Dasein as we find it in *BT*. On this interpretation, Heidegger models this most famous of all his concepts after Aristotle’s account of the soul from *DA* as isomorphic with whatever it currently cognises. Indeed, Dasein proves central to the inquiry into Being he attempts in that book precisely because, like soul (according

⁸ SZ: 14 [4]. Worth noting here is the additional reference Heidegger gives us for SC, which takes us to the following passage of *DA*: ‘And there is one sort of thinking (*voūç*) by coming to be all things, and another sort by producing them all, as a kind of positive state, like light. For in a certain way, light makes colours which are in potentiality colours in actuality.’ *DA*: III, 5, 430a14-17. The passage comes from what is probably the most controversial chapter of *DA*, where Aristotle introduces, alongside the faculty of thought that becomes like whatever the soul is thinking (on which he focusses throughout Book III), a faculty of thought that somehow *generates* whatever the soul is thinking. The controversy is whether the generative faculty of thought is actually a part of the human soul (the alternative interpretation claims that it is tantamount to God, as Aristotle describes her in *Metaphysics*). Fortunately, we do not need to get into the thick of the controversy to appreciate the intent of Heidegger’s supplementary reference: to demonstrate that the soul, which, in a way, is all beings, is distinct from whatever generates all beings (so, no ‘vicious subjectivizing’). Furthermore, Aristotle’s analogy of light should be borne in mind when we get to Chapter 5 of Division 1 of *BT* and Heidegger’s famous discussion of Dasein as ‘illuminated’ (*erleuchtet*) and indeed a kind of ‘*Lichtung*’. Unfortunately, I cannot pursue this connection here. See Shields 2016, pp. 312-329, for an overview of the controversy and a thrilling double commentary to the relevant chapter of *DA*, and SZ: 133 [28] for the *Lichtung*-passage.

to SC), it is capable of becoming like *all* beings, Heidegger's initial suppression of 'πάντα' notwithstanding.⁹

Sections 2-4 offer systematic objections to two variants of the familiar reading of Heidegger's priority argument relying on a different historical analogy: the analogy is with the 'Copernican thought,'¹⁰ from which, on Kant's own famous telling, grew his *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the varying details will be courtesy of Philipse and Carman. Section 5 links the priority argument to another Aristotelian inheritance that helped to fund Heidegger's project in *BT*: both of what Heidegger calls the 'problem of the unity of Being'¹¹ - roughly, how Being can be the subject-matter of a single inquiry if, as Aristotle argues in *Metaphysics*, it fails to constitute a single 'γένος' (a term naturally translated as 'kind'¹²)? - and of a solution to this problem appealing to 'πρὸς ἐν' or 'core-dependent' homonymy; that is to say, to a notion of a heterogenous subject-matter, whose constitutive kinds are still somehow held together by one kind in their number.¹³ Section 6 demonstrates that the proposed model of Dasein's relation to

⁹ Note that the gloss following SC in the excerpted passage *does* comment on its suppressed content - the omission is clearly accidental.

¹⁰ *KRV*: Bxvi.

¹¹ *SZ*: 3 [1].

¹² But see my 2021 for some cautionary notes.

¹³ Both these inheritances were remarked upon in the literature, but never (as will be my approach below) in relation to Heidegger's discussion of the first prejudice against the proposed repetition of the inquiry into Being in Section 1 of *BT*. For other approaches, see Sheehan (1981, p. viii), Taminiaux (1994, pp. 44-45), Philipse (1998, p. 96), McManus 2013 (by far the most developed and interesting), and McDaniel (2016, p. 312; 2017, p. 26).

other kinds of being solves the ‘problem of the unity of Being’; Section 7 fills in the details, and Section 8 responds to an objection concerning the nature of Dasein’s priority.

2. Copernican Inversion?

Heidegger’s argument for the priority of Dasein with respect to the question of Being hinges on the *puzzling claim* (PC) that

PC: whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein’s own ontic structure, in which a pre-ontological *understanding of Being* is comprised as a definite characteristic. (*SZ*: 13 [4], emphasis added)

For, what follows PC is just a statement of the argument’s conclusion – ‘*fundamental ontology*, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the *existential analytic of Dasein*’¹⁴ – and what precedes it, beyond a reference to Dasein’s essential ‘understanding of Being’ taken up in PC,¹⁵ is a brief consideration in favour of PC, most likely intended to recall Heidegger’s conclusions from Section 3 of *BT*, outlining his vision of how philosophical ‘ontologies’ - and positive sciences drawing on (and sometimes contributing to) them in various ways - hang together.¹⁶

However, the controversy surrounding Heidegger’s priority argument focussed not so much on the plausibility of that vision – in other words, on whether PC is true – but rather on what the supposed truth of PC has to do with the argument’s conclusion, anyway? Surely, as

¹⁴ *SZ*: 13 [4].

¹⁵ ‘Pre-ontological’ just means that the ‘understanding’ at issue need not be tantamount to a fully developed answer to the question of Being, in which case PC would come out false. Cf. *SZ*: 12 [4].

¹⁶ Cf. *SZ*: 8-11 [3].

Philipse (1998, p. 44) observes, ‘from the fact that astronomy is a human activity’ – and so, it is hard to deny that, in some sense, it has its ‘foundation and motivation’ in facts about human beings – ‘it does not follow that the sciences of man are somehow more fundamental than astronomy.’ So, what is it about Dasein’s ‘understanding of Being’ - to which PC clearly wants to draw our attention - that might persuade us that Philipse’s instructive counterexample isn’t conclusive?

All reconstructions of PC I am aware of appeal here, in more or less explicit fashion, to what Carman (2003, p. 10) dubs ‘an unmistakable analogy between Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in *BT* and the “Copernican revolution” in philosophy Kant claimed to have brought about in the *Critique of Pure Reason*’ – that is to say, Kant’s ‘trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.’¹⁷

Doubts whether PC, understood in the Copernican way, can be made plausible are many and widely known. Indeed, doubters include proponents of Copernican reconstructions of Heidegger’s project in *BT*¹⁸ and, as is also recognised,¹⁹ Heidegger himself.²⁰ However, my

¹⁷ *KRV*: Bxvi.

¹⁸ See, for example, Philipse 1998; Blattner 1999; Lafont 1999, 2000, 2002 (see McManus 2015 for a summary and an interesting response); Käufer 2002.

¹⁹ E.g., Philipse 1998, p. 219.

²⁰ See, for example, *LH*: 234; Richardson 2003, p. xix. I would add to this the disclaimer in *BT* that the priority of Dasein ‘has obviously nothing in common with a vicious subjectivizing of the totality of beings’ (*SZ*: 14 [4]), but the proponents of Copernican readings will no doubt reply that since the ‘subjectivizing of the totality of beings’ on offer isn’t *vicious* (for whatever reason), it does not contradict this disclaimer. I am not sure what to say to this other than that

concern in the next two sections will be whether Copernican interpretations of PC are even compatible with two incontrovertible assumptions of Heidegger's project in *BT*: first, that there are 'kinds of being' (*Seinsarten*) and, second, that *BT* is, indeed, a book about Being.

3. A Straightforwardly Kantian Proposal

Kant ultimately spells out his 'Copernican thought' of the conformity of objects of experience with our experience of them in terms of *identity* between 'conditions' constitutive of each. In his own words,

the *a priori* conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience.²¹

To appreciate what this means, it is best to consider another philosophical presence that asserts itself in Heidegger's early work – Husserl – who often claims that various 'noetic' structures of experience (pertaining to its transcendental subject²²) 'constitute' their corresponding 'noematic' structures (pertaining to the object²³). For example, he argues in *Ideas I* that 'Nature is only as being constituted in regular concatenations of consciousness.'²⁴ Now, while each such a Husserlian claim entails a distinction between noesis and noema (in fact, Husserl

it is vicious in at least one of the two ways I describe in Sections 3 and 4 (and arguably in some other ways described in the literature).

²¹ *KRV*: A111, A158/B197.

²² Cf. *Ideas I*: 171-175 [85].

²³ Cf. *Ideas I*: 181-183 [88].

²⁴ *Ideas I*: 96 [51].

typically develops his noetic analyses on the basis of the noematic ones²⁵), for Kant, there are no two distinct sets of ‘categories’, for example, one delimiting the subject and another the object of the understanding. Rather, the *same* ‘categories’ (such as reality, negation, and limitation – to name just Kant’s categories ‘of quality’²⁶) designate *both* the limits of the intelligibility of experience *and* the limits of the intelligible objects. Thus, though we might conceive of them in two different ways, the two sets of conditions prove to be one and the same ‘thing’ – the twelve categories - much like in the astronomic discovery that the Morning Star and the Evening Star are, in fact, the same celestial body.

Hence, I’ll call ‘straightforwardly Kantian’ any reading of PC that stipulates that, for Heidegger, the conditions in terms of which he ultimately analyses Dasein’s understanding of Being in *BT* are likewise identical to the conditions in terms of which he analyses other kinds of beings in *BT* such as ‘readiness-to-hand’ (*Vorhandenheit*) and ‘presence-at-hand’ (*Zuhandenheit*) – I’ll say more about each later.

Such a straightforwardly Kantian interpretation of PC finds its advocate in Philipse (1998: 122) himself, who answers his own objection by interpreting *BT* as an extended transcendental argument. This type of argument argues, first, ‘that some set of “subjective” conditions is necessary for experiencing entities,’ and second, ‘that *these very same conditions*

²⁵ For a simple example of this methodology, see his analysis of a perception of a table in *Ideas I*: 73-76 [41]. For a complicated example (that perhaps illustrates this better), see the Fifth *CM* dedicated to the experience of others.

²⁶ Cf. *KRV*: A80/B106.

specify the necessary conditions that these entities must satisfy in order to *be*, in the sense of being accessible to us.’²⁷

Philipse proposes that most analyses that make up Heidegger’s existential analytic feed into the first stage of the overarching transcendental argument of *BT*. He does not explain how the second stage of this argument is supposed to work, but he has little doubt that it is its conclusion that we find

in sections 43c and 44c of *Sein und Zeit*, where [Heidegger] says that “only as long as Dasein, the ontical possibility of understanding of being, is, ‘there is’ being”; that “Being—not entities—is something which ‘there is’ only in so far as truth is,” and that “truth *is* only in so far and as long as Dasein is.” (Philipse 1998, p. 123)

This ‘explains the primacy of Dasein’,²⁸ presumably because, if the overarching transcendental argument succeeds, the existential analytic of Dasein will be tantamount to an analysis of all kinds of being that - taken together - *just are* Dasein’s understanding of Being, albeit looked at

²⁷ Italics altered. See Braver 2014, p. 18 for another version of this proposal. Mulhall 2005, pp. 17-18, is also worth reading, though he does not invoke Kant there, as is his 2001 where he does (p. 255). Note, though, that a lightly retouched version of his commentary to Section 4 of *BT* itself in Mulhall 2001 (pp. 205-206) seems to lean towards what I will later call a qualifiedly Kantian reading. (In the original version, grasping the structure of the understanding of Being was supposed to be tantamount to grasping ‘the constitutive structure of that which is thereby understood,’ changed in the revised version to the ‘grammatical structure of that which is [thereby] understood’ – my italics.)

²⁸ Philipse 1998, p. 123.

from another angle. By contrast, an ‘analytic’ of any other kind of being could cover no more than that kind of being and a corresponding fraction of Dasein’s understanding of Being.²⁹

Although asking us to envisage the conclusion of the main argument of *BT* in roughly the middle of what amounts to one-third of this never completed essay³⁰ without even attempting to engage with its excessively challenging context is already a tall order, I will now argue that the straightforwardly Kantian project *as such* – that is to say, irrespective of how we might fill in the exegetical details³¹ – is misguided in that it undermines a distinction Heidegger wants to make between different kinds of being (recently brought to attention of a wider philosophical community by McDaniel³²), and that, as such, it undermines itself.

Thus, for Heidegger, the subject-matter of his question of Being is divided between several incommensurate kinds of being. Put differently, although Heidegger allows that we can refer to anything and everything as a ‘being’ (‘Being,’ he repeats after Aristotle, ‘is the most general concept’,³³) , beings *are* in different ways, each according to its kind. For example,

²⁹ In fact, I adapt this explanation from Mulhall 2005, p. 17. Philipse (1998, p. 319) himself offers the following: ‘Because the conditions [for experiencing objects] are inherent in Dasein, the ontology of Dasein is more fundamental than other ontologies, which explore the [...] conditions [for the objects of experience].’ But, surely, if the two sets of conditions are, as Philipse’s Heidegger maintains, the same, they would ‘inhere’ as much in Daseins as in non-Daseins.

³⁰ Cf. SZ: 39-40 [8].

³¹ Cf. Mulhall’s (2005, pp. 17-18) defence of PC drawing, more plausibly, on the first chapter of the Introduction alone.

³² See especially his 2009 and 2017.

³³ SZ: 2 [1]. See Section 5 below for some comments.

whereas being a Dasein consists in exercising an understanding of Being - ultimately analysed by Heidegger in terms of the tripartite structure of ‘care’ (*Sorge*) - being a ready-to-hand item, paradigmatically (but, as we shall see in Section 7, not only) a tool, consists in ‘referring’ or ‘assigning’ (*Verweisen*) Dasein to other ready-to-hand items. For example, ‘[h]ammer, tongs, and needle, refer in themselves to steel, iron, metal, mineral, wood, in that they consist of these.’³⁴ There is, for Heidegger, no single ‘achievement’, as McManus (2013, p. 659) puts it, common to Daseins as Daseins and tools as ready-to-hand. Things just do not get any more basic than that.³⁵

Now, if, as Philipse’s Heidegger maintains, the conditions for the understanding of Being were identical to the conditions for the kinds of being other than Dasein, then we could no longer speak of discrete kinds of being in this sense. For then, granted that Dasein’s way of being just is the understanding of Being, everything would be in Dasein’s way. Hence, Being would manifest itself in one and the same way in everything. But this contradicts Heidegger’s ‘ontological pluralism’³⁶ above.

This should worry us, because, without ontological pluralism, the very notion of Dasein’s priority becomes incomprehensible, and, indeed, doubly so. First, if everything was

³⁴ SZ: 70 [15].

³⁵ Of course, in some *highly* unobvious sense, for the early Heidegger, time is even more basic than being – but here again we only find fragments rather than variants of time (in the sense of reiterations of the same thing with a difference), so it is hard to see how time could serve as what Aristotle would designate as a common ‘γένος’ of different kinds of being (cf. Section 5 below). Besides McDaniel 2009 and McManus 2013, my forthcoming might also be worth looking at here.

³⁶ Cf. Turner 2010.

in Dasein's way, there would be nothing to which Dasein might be prior in Being. So, without ontological pluralism, it would be incomprehensible that the priority Heidegger attempts to establish in *BT* belongs to Dasein. But it would be just as incomprehensible, second, how anything else could take its place. Surely, if Being manifests itself in everything in the same way, 'the starting-point' for Heidegger's inquiry into Being must be entirely 'arbitrary' (*beliebig*).³⁷ Thus, without ontological pluralism, we could not make sense of the notion of *any* being that 'must *first* be interrogated ontologically.'³⁸

Hence, instead of solving the problem of the priority of Dasein, a straightforwardly Kantian approach simply makes it unintelligible. But this does not make the problem go away. For Heidegger's claim of Dasein's priority remains. Straightforwardly Kantian approach to *BT* fails on many counts, indeed.

4. A Qualifiedly Kantian Proposal

I believe that a more fertile ground for Heidegger's ontological pluralism can be found in a version of the Copernican analogy set out by Carman (2003, p. 17), who emphatically denies that, when Heidegger claims in Section 43C of *BT* that 'only as long as Dasein *is...* 'is there' (*gibt es*) being,' he means to say 'that entities in general exist only if and when human beings exist' - since exactly this is entailed by a straightforwardly Kantian reading of this claim, I will call what follows the 'qualifiedly Kantian' proposal. Rather, he only means to say that

the intelligibility of entities, their making sense *as* entities depends on human beings, whose own being, Heidegger maintains, consists essentially in having an understanding of being. (Carman 2003, p. 17)

³⁷ SZ: 7 [2].

³⁸ SZ: 13 [4]. Italic added.

Thus, Carman's Heidegger does not need to argue that the understanding of Being that defines Dasein's Being also defines the remaining kinds of being, and in so arguing, to effectively argue against the distinction between kinds of being. He only needs to argue that non-Daseins depend on Dasein in such a way that their 'intelligibility', their 'making sense *as* entities', is – at least partly – Dasein's doing. Hence, Dasein and non-Daseins could still be in a plethora of different ways.³⁹

Still, in taking this step forward, the proponent of the Copernican analogy also seems to take a step backward with respect to what motivated the analogy in the first place (at least for Philipse and Carman⁴⁰): the puzzle of how PC relates to the conclusion of Heidegger's priority argument. To paraphrase Philipse, concepts employed in astronomy are, in fact, entertained by human beings. So, it is hard to deny that, in some sense, the intelligibility of each and every astronomical object is owed to us, human beings. Even so, if I want to find out about black holes, for example, I ought to study black holes themselves, rather than their researchers, the entirely uncontroversial dependence of their intelligibility to human beings on human beings notwithstanding. Hence, we must return to Carman (2003: 9) with his own question: if the relationship between the conditions for the understanding of Being and the conditions for the Being of non-Daseins isn't one of identity, 'what' – other – 'unique link between being and human being requires that fundamental ontology proceed by means of an analytic of Dasein?'

Carman's reply is as follows (pardon a long quotation):

³⁹ Indeed, Carman (2003, p. 65) recognises that 'Heidegger is a pluralist about the meanings of being for different kinds of entities.' Cf. Carman 2013.

⁴⁰ Cf. Philipse 1998, p. 122; Carman 2003, pp. 9-10.

consider [...] asking about a foreign or ancient word by addressing or “interrogating” a text in order to ascertain the word’s meaning. One can distinguish the word from its meaning in this merely formal and provisional way without denying that the meaning is, after all, constitutive of the word, that the meaning is what makes the word the word it is, and that to understand the word is in effect to understand its meaning. So too, for Heidegger, being is constituted by the meaning of being, so that an understanding of being is in effect the same as an understanding of its meaning. As he says later in *BT*, meaning is not an entity at all over and beyond that of which it is the meaning; therefore, grasping the meaning of anything simply consists in understanding the thing itself: “[S]trictly speaking, what is understood is not the meaning, but the entity” (*SZ* 151). The meaning of being is likewise nothing distinct from or additional to being itself; to understand being is simply to grasp its meaning. (Carman 2003, p. 16)

Unfortunately, Carman’s reasoning is patently fallacious.

While it is true that a natural way to find out about an unknown word consists in interrogating the meaning of that word by whatever means are appropriate, and so, the distinction between an unknown word and its meaning seems to be of little practical importance, this does not entail that ‘[t]he meaning of being is likewise nothing distinct from or additional to being itself.’ All that follows is just that the meaning of being will be (likewise) nothing distinct from or additional to the word ‘being’. But Heidegger isn’t concerned merely with the word ‘being’. Consider that, in *that* case, there would be nothing puzzling about the role of PC in the priority argument. Rather, the puzzle arises *only insofar* as we think that fundamental ontology wants to problematise Being and kinds thereof rather than merely the

words we have for them. And Carman does nothing to challenge this plausible – and easily verifiable – assumption.⁴¹

Thus, contrary to what Carman’s analogy might suggest, even though ‘*Sein*’ and ‘Being’ are different words, rendering Heidegger’s ‘*Frage nach dem Sein*’ as the ‘inquiry into Being’ does not change the subject-matter of this inquiry. This amounts to a family of determinations of beings⁴² that *just happen* to be designated by the word ‘*Sein*’ and its cognate expressions in German.⁴³ And the qualifiedly Kantian approach to PC fails to explain how Heidegger’s existential analytic could hope to address that subject-matter - something its straightforward counterpart accomplished easily (whether or not existential analytic ultimately delivers on this hope is, of course, a different matter).

Thus, in the end, the proponent of the Copernican analogy faces a peculiar dilemma. *Either* she needs to give up on Heidegger’s commitment to ontological pluralism (and,

⁴¹ In lieu of more substantive exegesis, Heidegger expressly claims, for example, that ‘we lack... most of the words’ required for talking about the Being of beings. *SZ*: 38 [7C]. So, for Heidegger, knowing all there is to know about the words we have for Being is not sufficient for knowing all there is to know about Being.

⁴² Cf. ‘That which is inquired about (*das Gefragte*) in the inquiry to be developed (*ausarbeitenden*) [in this essay] is Being: that which determines (*bestimmt*) beings as beings, that in terms of which beings are already understood, irrespective of the angle under which they are to be discussed.’ *SZ*: 6 [2].

⁴³ Consider also that, if we accepted that suggestion, then we could hardly make sense of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as a ‘repetition’ of inquiries of Plato and Aristotle. Plainly, neither Plato nor Aristotle was concerned with some words of German. Cf. *SZ*: 2 [1], Section 5 below.

consequently, on the intelligibility of the claim of the priority of Dasein) – this was the lot of the straightforwardly Kantian approach – or, as the present discussion shows, she can keep this commitment (and, consequently, the intelligibility of the claim of the priority of Dasein) at an even steeper price of Heidegger's claim that, even though it focusses on Dasein's understanding of Being, *BT* is, indeed, a book about Being. What I want to show in the rest of this paper is that the reader of *BT* need not, however, face this dilemma.

5. The First Prejudice and Four Aristotelian Threads

The mysterious reappearance of SC in Section 4 of *BT* isn't the first time Heidegger weaves distinctly Aristotelian threads into the argument of the book. Disregarding a general acknowledgment of Aristotle's struggles with the question of Being in the opening paragraph of Section 1 (preceded by those of Plato),⁴⁴ this distinction must go to Heidegger's discussion of the first of the three 'prejudices' (*Vorurteile*) against the proposed 'repetition' of the Herculean exertions of the two ancient greats later in the same section, comprising mentions of

(1) Aristotle's claim that 'Being is the most general concept,'

(2) Aristotle's argument that 'neither unity nor being are γένη,'

(3) 'Aristotle's problem of the unity of Being,'

and, finally, of

(4) Aristotle's solution to this problem in terms of 'unity of analogy.'

I now want to make some remarks about this discussion with regard to each of the four threads.

⁴⁴ SZ: 2 [1].

Aristotle's project in *Metaphysics* – to which they all go back – is to develop the ‘first science’ (ἐπιστήμη)⁴⁵ concerned with the ‘first principles and causes.’⁴⁶ Because Aristotle reserves this distinction for the *most general* principles and causes,⁴⁷ he eventually concludes that the first science is no other than the science of beings as beings.⁴⁸ For anything and everything is a being. As Aristotle himself puts it (in my translation of Heidegger’s translation), ‘Being is the most general concept.’⁴⁹

That was the *first* Aristotelian thread. And, even though the claim just cited headlines Heidegger’s discussion of an alleged prejudice against the repetition of the ancient inquiry into Being – and so, of something he wants to unmask and challenge – Heidegger actually *agrees* with it. What he finds prejudicial is just the thought (attributed to no one in particular) that spelling out the extension of the word ‘being’ (which is what the claim amounts to) – everything – completes the inquiry into Being.⁵⁰ And to show that it is so, Heidegger introduces the *second* Aristotelian thread.

Heidegger pulls it from Book Beta of *Metaphysics*, consisting in a list of puzzles (ἀπορίαι) that fall in the remit of Aristotle’s projected ‘first science’ (or, as we shall see in a moment, in fact threaten its possibility). The seventh ἀπορία, in particular, asks whether Aristotle’s ‘first principles and causes’ are the ‘primary’ – that is to say, the most general –

⁴⁵ *Met.*: VI, 1, 1026a16, 1026a29.

⁴⁶ *Met.*: I, 2, 982b9-10.

⁴⁷ *Met.*: I, 2, 982a21-22.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Met.*: IV, 1, 1003a21–22

⁴⁹ *Met.*: III, 4, 1001a21. Cf. SZ: 3 [1].

⁵⁰ These two points are missed by van Inwagen 2009. Quine and Heidegger have more in common than he thinks, although, as I argue in my forthcoming, not much more.

‘γένη’ or ‘the last that are predicated of individuals’, and that is to say, *infimae species*.⁵¹ The argument that ‘neither unity nor being is a γένος’⁵² spells out Aristotle’s objection to the first possibility (followed by an objection to the second one – hence the puzzle).

Although, in a recent translation of Book Beta for the Clarendon Aristotle Series, Arthur Madigan renders ‘γένη’ above as ‘kinds’ (replacing Ross’s Latinate ‘genera’), the reader of *Metaphysics* should not assume that any characteristic shared between a number of objects is a kind in this sense (though Aristotle sometimes employs this word in this capacity, too, for example in his formulation of *infimae species* above⁵³). Rather, as Aristotle explains in *Topics*⁵⁴ (and Madigan in his commentary⁵⁵), it is a *species of a kind* in the usual sense, which can be cited in a type of definition of which ‘a human being is a rational animal’ is Aristotle’s usual example.

The *definiens* in a definition of this type consists of two items. The first item, exemplified above by the animal nature, expresses a characteristic exhibited by all objects characterised by the *definiendum* (in Aristotle’s example, the human nature) as well as by some objects that are *not* characterised by the *definiendum* – that’s γένος. The second, exemplified by rationality, designates the characteristic distinguishing the former from the latter. That’s ‘διαφορά’.

Thus, the conclusion of Aristotle’s argument states that neither unity nor – more importantly for Heidegger – being could be cited in this type of definition in the capacity of a

⁵¹ *Met.*: III, 3, 998b14-16.

⁵² *Met.*: III. 3, 998b21-27.

⁵³ See my 2021 for some discussion.

⁵⁴ *Top.*: I, 5, 102a31-36.

⁵⁵ Madigan 1999, 75.

$\gammaένος$. (I cannot reconstruct this complicated argument here,⁵⁶ but it goes roughly like this: unity and being are predicable of all objects in the extension of $\deltaιαφορά$ in any definition of the type under consideration – due to their utmost generality; but no characteristic serving as $\gammaένος$ in such a definition is predicable of all objects in the extension of $\deltaιαφορά$ in the same definition.)

So, what does it all have to do with Heidegger's question of Being?

Aristotle commentators standardly link the seventh $\alphaπορία$ from Book Beta above – are the ‘first principles’ primary $\gammaένη$ or *infimae species*? – with the *third* one: is there a single science dealing with the first principles or are there, rather, many?⁵⁷ More perspicuously, does the projected ‘first science’ even have a distinctive subject-matter? Or is Aristotle’s project in *Metaphysics* destined to encounter several unrelated subject-matters, each distinctive to a different science, in much the same way in which there cannot be a unified body of knowledge concerned with all banks as banks, all locks as locks, and all cranes as cranes?⁵⁸ Rather, there will be a body of knowledge concerned with banks, the financial institutions, another body of knowledge concerned with banks, by the river, and so on.

Though its terms might be antiquated, Aristotle’s challenge here, I think, loses none of its original acuity. The argument that Being is not a $\gammaένος$, if successful,⁵⁹ tells us that nothing

⁵⁶ For that, see Loux 1973, Berti 2002, or, indeed, my 2021.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Politis 2004, p. 84. Cf. *Met.*: III, 2, 997a15–25.

⁵⁸ Remember that Aristotle’s Greek for science is ‘ $\epsilon\piιστήμη$ ’ - that’s also the word for knowledge.

⁵⁹ I cannot evaluate Aristotle’s argument here. But I do want to say that the two major objections to this argument that I know of, one concerning the premise that no characteristic serving as $\gammaένος$ can be predicated of all objects in the extension of $\deltaιαφορά$ in the same

could be defined as a being with some additional distinction (as in, to take two prominent real-world examples, Cartesian definitions of mental and material beings as, respectively, non-extended and extended), such that we could abstract away from all such distinctions between beings and focus on what's left. But if Heidegger's attempted 'fundamental ontology' does not concern itself with what's left – for, if Aristotle is right, there are simply no (internally coherent) definitions for us to abstract away from in this way – then does it concern itself with anything more substantial than a 'mere disjunction'⁶⁰ of the subject-matters of 'regional ontologies,'⁶¹ which thus belong together only nominally? Heidegger calls this possibility one of a 'multiplicity of the highest *Gattung*-concepts applicable to things' – '*Gattung*' being his rendition of $\gamma\acute{e}vo\varsigma$ - and the question of how they can be brought into accord 'Aristotle's problem of the unity of Being.'⁶²

That was the *third* Aristotelian thread, and this one, at the long last, does help us understand what is wrong with the first prejudice against the retrieval of the question of Being.

It is that what at first appeared to be an answer to this question in fact threatens its integrity. For, we get to the point of thinking that unity and being can be predicated of all objects in the extension of any predicate in the position of $\delta\imath\alpha\phi\varphi\acute{a}$ – a premise in Aristotle's

definition (as raised in Shields 1999, pp. 247-260) and another concerning whether Aristotle's *reductio*-premise (i.e., unity and being are $\gamma\acute{e}\nu\eta$) in fact entails a violation of this rule (as raised in my 2021), have been rebutted. See Berti 2002 for a reply to Shields' challenge and my 2021 for a reply to mine. (In addition, my 2021 effectively shows that Shields' challenge depends on a mistaken view of what the argument tries to establish.)

⁶⁰ McDaniel 2009, p. 305.

⁶¹ Cf. *PICPR*: 24-27.

⁶² *SZ*: 3 [1].

argument above - by persuading ourselves that unity and being can be predicated of anything and everything - that's the first Aristotelian thread (and its counterpart regarding unity).

Obviously, Heidegger cannot leave things at that. For that would be an even better reason for abandoning the project of the retrieval of the question of Being than an offhand suggestion of an answer to this question advocated by no one Heidegger can (or wants to) name. And it is here that things become really interesting - at least to me.

What Heidegger now says in German is this:

Die Einheit dieses transzentalen »Allgemeinen« gegenüber der Mannigfaltigkeit der sachhaltigen obersten Gattungsbegriffe hat *schon* Aristoteles als die Einheit der Analogie erkannt. Mit dieser Entdeckung hat Aristoteles bei aller Abhängigkeit von der ontologischen Fragestellung Platons das Problem des Seins auf eine grundsätzlich neue Basis gestellt. (SZ: 3 [1])⁶³

There are two main points I want to make about this short – but crucial – passage.

First, both available translations of the passage into English *mistranslate* the first of its two sentences. Macquarrie and Robinson reproduce it as follows (and Stambaugh follows them on the point of contention):

Aristotle *himself* knew the unity of this transcendental ‘universal’ as a unity of analogy in contrast to the multiplicity of the highest generic concepts applicable to things. With this discovery, in spite of his dependence on the way in which the ontological question had been formulated by Plato, he put the problem of Being on what was, in principle, a new basis. (SZ: 3 [1])⁶⁴

⁶³ Italics altered.

⁶⁴ *Ditto.*

Well, that is not what Heidegger says! What he says is that *already* – ‘schon’ – Aristotle knew the unity of Being as the unity of analogy; not that he, *himself*, knew it. Thus, Heidegger does not emphasise that what, in effect, is the fourth Aristotelian thread was, indeed, spun by Aristotle. He emphasises that what he regards as the *obviously right* solution to the ‘problem of the unity’ of Being - threatening his own project - was known *as early as* in Aristotle’s times. (Heidegger will note shortly that ‘[the] problem [of the categorial interconnections sustaining this unity] was [still] widely discussed in the medieval ontology’.)

I can no more than guess that the translators felt the need to censor Heidegger’s ‘*schon*’ in reaction to the sentence following the controversial passage:

To be sure, even Aristotle failed to clear away the darkness (*Dunkel*) of these categorial interconnections. (SZ: 3 [1].)⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Their decision could also be influenced by the following remark from *AM*, at least in principle (*AM/GA33* was first published long after Macquarrie and Robinson had completed their translation, so it is unlikely that they knew about it): ‘The analogy of being – this designation is not a solution to the being-question (*die Seinsfrage*), indeed not even an actual posing of the question, but the title for the most stringent aporia, the impasse in which ancient philosophy, and along with it all subsequent philosophy right up to today, is enmeshed.’ (*AM*: 38; cf. *GA33*: 46). However, I do not claim that, for Heidegger, Aristotle’s appeal to the ‘unity of analogy’ could solve the question of Being (*Seinsfrage*) itself. What I claim is that, for Heidegger, the appeal to the ‘unity of analogy’ could solve the ‘problem of the unity of Being’, threatening the integrity of the question of Being. There are two different questions/problems here, and so, there is no contradiction between my translation of the controversial passage from *BT* and Heidegger’s remark from *AM*.

But there are *many* ways in which Heidegger could agree with Aristotle's general proposal that the unity of Being is, indeed, the 'unity of analogy' while contesting any one of its (badly needed) specifications.

For one thing, Heidegger disagrees with Aristotle what needs to be unified here in the first place. Whereas Aristotle lists ten such ways for things to be in *Categories*⁶⁶ and, in *Metaphysics*, he considers three additional senses of 'τὸ ὅν' – 'being' - beyond the categorial one (when used for accidental features of objects, for being-true, and for being in potentiality or in actuality),⁶⁷ Heidegger ultimately settles on his own 'kinds of being' that cut across these ancient divisions.

However, the most likely explanation of what's going on in the passage above can be found in Heidegger's lecture notes from the Summer Semester of 1931, published posthumously as *Aristotle's Metaphysics θ 1-3 (AM)*. There, Heidegger elaborates on a worry that, even if Aristotle's solution to the problem of the unity of Being unifies Aristotle's categories, it fails to unify the categories with whatever 'τὸ ὅν' in its remaining three senses talks about.⁶⁸ It is very likely that he has the same thing in mind here, since, after briefly considering one Aristotelian proposal for how to complete Aristotle's work of unification in *AM*, the discussion ends on this familiar note: 'Hier wird alles Dunkel'⁶⁹ ('Here everything becomes obscure'). Hence, it is natural to read the relevant discussion in *AM* – I will cite more

⁶⁶ Cf. *Cat.*: 4, 1b25-2a4.

⁶⁷ See *Met.*: V, 7, 1017a7- 1017b9; VI, 2, 1026a33–b2.

⁶⁸ *AM*: 37.

⁶⁹ *GA33*: 46.

of it below – as a development of his compressed remarks about Aristotle’s problem of the unity of Being in *BT*.⁷⁰

The second point I want to make concerns the *nature* of the ‘unity of analogy.’ As Heidegger himself observes in *AM*, medieval scholarship of Aristotle distinguished between two *kinds* of analogy at work in Aristotle.⁷¹

The first kind - analogy of attribution - is the medieval rendition of what Aristotle himself calls ‘πρὸς ἐν’ (‘in relation to one’) homonymy,⁷² elegantly rendered by Shields (1999) as ‘core-dependent homonymy’. Here, diverse – indeed, heterogenous - kinds are somehow unified by one kind in their number. Aristotle does indeed argue that Being is unified in this way by the category of ‘substance’ (*οὐσία*) in Chapters 2 of Book Gamma, 1 of Zeta, and 3 of Kappa of *Metaphysics*. Examples of core-dependent homonymy he considers comparatively uncontroversial are healthiness - unified by healthiness as it manifests itself in a body (as opposed to a diet, for example) - and the medical, unified by the medical nature of medicine itself as opposed to the medical natures of a scalpel or a textbook.⁷³

The second kind - analogy of proportion - holds between a set of items that relate to another set of items in the same way. For example, a block of wood, a half-line, and a man capable of contemplation enjoy this sort of unity inasmuch as (says Aristotle) each stands in the same kind of relation to, respectively, a statue of Hermes, a whole line, and a man who is currently contemplating - Aristotle claims that items on the first list are in potentiality what

⁷⁰ For other reading strategies, see Philipse 1998, pp. 93-97 and McManus 2013, pp. 653-654, 660.

⁷¹ See *AM*: 48.

⁷² E.g., in *Met.*: IV, 2, 1003a33-1003b18.

⁷³ E.g., *Met.*: IV, 2, 1003a35-1003b6.

items on the second list are in actuality.⁷⁴ According to Aristotle, this suffices to show that potentiality and actuality make up single subject-matters, even in the absence of their appropriate definitions.⁷⁵ Interestingly, he claims in Chapter 6 of Book Nu of *Metaphysics* that Being in the categorial sense enjoys this type of unity, too:

there is an analogous item in each category of being; straight in length is as level in surface, and perhaps as odd in number and white in colour. (*Met.*: XIV, 6, 1093b19-21)

Most contemporary literature on the unity of Being in *Metaphysics* deals, in effect, with core-dependent homonymy.⁷⁶ So, from this perspective, my proposal that that is how Heidegger sees things, too, might seem perfectly innocuous. However, Aristotle scholarship that informed Heidegger's work did not, in fact, share this perspective. For example, Brentano argues in his *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* – a book that, on Heidegger's own account of his philosophical development, sparked his interest in the question of Being⁷⁷ – that both analogies play a role in Aristotle's thinking.⁷⁸ Tellingly, Brentano stakes this plausible claim against his own master, Trendelenburg, who apparently takes analogy of proportion to be paradigmatic for analogy in general (in his sweeping *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*). Heidegger must have been acquainted with Trendelenburg's work, too, if only through

⁷⁴ Cf. *Met.*: IX, 6, 1048a32-34.

⁷⁵ ‘What we want to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, and one should not look for a definition of everything but should also take in what is analogical [...].’ *Met.*: IX, 6, 1048a35-7.

⁷⁶ This is true of all relevant literature cited here.

⁷⁷ E.g., Richardson 2003, p. xi.

⁷⁸ Brentano 1975, p. 64.

Brentano's critique.⁷⁹ So, when Heidegger asserts in *BT* that 'already Aristotle knew the unity of [Being] as the unity of analogy,' *which one* does he have in mind: core-dependent homonymy, analogy proper,⁸⁰ or both?

Actually, *AM* pits Heidegger against Trendelenburg and Brentano both. Apparently oblivious to our last citation from Book Nu, Heidegger claims there that a clear instance of analogy of proportion from *Nicomachean Ethics* – 'as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul'⁸¹ - exemplifies 'another concept of analogy [...] that does *not* coincide with the categorial relationships'⁸² (discussed in detail earlier, in relation to Book Gamma⁸³). Similarly, after claiming that Aristotle's solution to the 'problem of the unity of Being' only works for Being in the categorial sense (but does not extend to the remaining three listed in *Metaphysics*), he asks:

What is the kind of unity in which this *broad πολλαχθός* [many (ways in which being is 'said')] is held together [...]? Is the unity here also that of analogy? And if so, what then is the *πρῶτον ὅν* [the first being], *πρός ὃ τά τέτταρα λέγεται* [with reference to which the four (employments of 'τὸ ὅν') are spoken]? [...] Here everything becomes obscure. (*AM*: 37-38)

⁷⁹ For (a very brief) explicit discussion of Trendelenburg on part of Heidegger see *HCT*: 19.

⁸⁰ Aristotle himself never uses 'analogy' for core-dependent homonymy, even though he might claim – as he does in the case of Being - that a single subject-matter might enjoy both kinds of unity.

⁸¹ *NE*: I, 6, 1096b28-30.

⁸² *GA33*: 45. Emphasis is Heidegger's. Cf. *AM*: 37.

⁸³ See *AM*: 31-34.

Heidegger assumes here that, if all - rather than just the categorial - ways of being were unified by ‘analogy’ in the relevant sense, then they, too, would be unified in a core-dependent way (‘And if so...’). If Heidegger shared either Trendelenburg’s or Brentano’s view of the unity of Being in Aristotle, he would not make this assumption. Therefore, he did not share either one of their views.⁸⁴

Hence, the apparent anachronism of my approach proves entirely justified: the *fourth* Aristotelian thread from Heidegger’s discussion of the first prejudice against the retrieval of the question of Being in *BT* states, in effect, that Being is a case of core-dependent homonymy.

And this, in turn, serves to motivate our own trial - if I may say so - whether we may not make more sense of Heidegger’s priority argument if we jettison the deeply entrenched Copernican analogy and try to understand it as arguing for the core-dependent homonymy of Being instead. Consider that the gap of nine pages separating the discussion of Aristotle’s problem of the unity of Being in Section 1 from the argument for the priority of *Dasein* in Section 4 should not worry us here. Heidegger *needs* this gap to introduce the concept of *Dasein* in the first place (in Section 2) and to attempt to make evident the dependence - required to support PC - of various scientific and ontological projects on its understanding of Being (in

⁸⁴ Might this be one of the reasons why Heidegger says in 1925 of Brentano’s ‘first work,’ which ‘sought to interpret Aristotle against the horizon of medieval philosophy, above all that of Thomas Aquinas,’ that ‘this is [not] really the way to understand Aristotle?’ (‘On the contrary, through this kind of interpretation Aristotle essentially undergoes a drastic reinterpretation.’) (*HCT*: 20.) Admittedly, though, although *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, published in 1862, is Brentano’s first work, Heidegger’s description above (as well as the context: Aristotelian background to Brentano’s *Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint*) has a better fit with *Psychology of Aristotle* from 1867.

Section 3). We might say, then, that Heidegger offers us his solution to ‘Aristotle’s problem of the unity of Being’ - helping him challenge the first prejudice of the anonymous *Seinsfrage*-denier alright, but at the seemingly reckless expense of threatening his entire project in *BT* - *as soon as he can.*⁸⁵

6. Cajetan’s Proposal and SC

In an influential medieval treatment of homonymy, *De Nominum Analogia*, Cardinal Tommaso de Vio – better known to posterity as Cajetan – argues that necessary and sufficient for homonymous kinds to relate to one another in a core-dependent way is that one kind in their number stands to the remaining kinds in a causal relationship falling under one of the four causal types recognised by Aristotle: material, formal, efficient, and final.⁸⁶ Shields (1999, p. 111) objects that causal relations in each core-dependent homonym cannot, as Cajetan appears to claim, be confined to a single causal type. Thus, for example, although Cajetan holds that ‘all derived cases of ‘medical’ somehow refer to the efficient cause,’ ‘a scalpel ‘counts as ‘medical’ not because it is related by an efficient cause to medicine, but because its function is given by the role it plays in medical practice’ (with medicine acting as its final cause). Still,

⁸⁵ In fact, our trial is independently encouraged by Philipse (1998, p. 96) himself. Other commentators who might view it favourably are Taminiaux (1994, p. 44-45) and McDaniel (2016, p. 312; 2017, p. 26). By contrast, McManus (2013), who agrees with me that, for Heidegger of *BT*, the best solution to something like my problem of the unity of Being is to be found in core-dependent homonymy, locates his attempt at it in the proposed – but never completed – ‘Interpretation of *time* as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.’ Cf. *SZ*: 1.

⁸⁶ A translation of the relevant passage can be found in Shields 1999, p. 110. For Aristotle’s theory of the four causes, see, for example, *Ph.*: II, 3, 194b23–35.

taking into account Shields' correction that each core-dependent homonym can be held together by a number of different causal relations, it is striking that both monograph-length studies of core-dependent homonymy published in English in recent years - Shields' own *Order in Multiplicity* and Aristotle on Homonymy we owe to Julie Ward – defend some version of Cajetan's proposal.

I will now offer two arguments to the effect that Heidegger accepts it, too, followed by a proposal of my own concerning how a reading of PC inspired by SC could give Heidegger a solution to 'Aristotle's problem of the unity of Being,' Cajetanian in spirit.

My first argument regards Heidegger's exegesis of core-dependent homonymy, mainly in his lecture notes for *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy (BCAP)* from the Summer Semester 1926 (produced during the time of *BT*'s gestation⁸⁷), but also in *AM*, five years posterior, already exploited for our purposes. In contrast to *AM*, the text of *BCAP* is extremely fragmented. Even so, it does help us make out two important features of Heidegger's understanding of the topic.

First, while *AM* links the distinction between '*analogia attributionis*' and '*analogia proportionalitatis*' to 'medieval scholasticism' in general,⁸⁸ *BCAP* refers it directly to Cajetan's treatise.⁸⁹ Indeed, the subsequent analysis of core-dependent homonymy in *Metaphysics*,

⁸⁷ Cf. Kisiel 1993, Appendix C.

⁸⁸ Cf. *AM*: 48.

⁸⁹ *BCAP*: 134 (footnote 73). Generally, the editor's practice of not differentiating between Heidegger's (apparently sparse) references and those supplied by himself makes it likely that any one reference will be an editorial superimposition. Still, in this case we can make an exception. While, sadly, the pandemic might make archival visits inadvisable for some time, footnote 73 contains references to two distinct editions of *De Nominum Analogia*, one from

Gamma 2, continues to employ Latin terminology most likely culled from *De Nominum Analogia*. Heidegger explicitly draws on just one additional source here – Plotinus – but he reads him in Greek. So, not only does Heidegger know about Cajetan’s interpretation of core-dependent homonymy, he also is prepared to rely on it in his own exegetical work.

Second, as *BCAP* and *AM* both show, Heidegger would reject another conception of core-dependent homonymy from contemporary literature, which, following Owen (1986), reconstructs core-dependent homonymy as a case of inclusion of the ‘focal meaning’ – for example, the meaning of ‘healthy’ as used for bodies - in the definitions of the word in question as used for other healthy items: for example, diets or complexions (as in, ‘healthy is a diet that sustains a healthy body’).⁹⁰ The crucial assumption here is that core-dependence is a relation between meanings of a word rather than between objects that this word refers to.

Thus, the following are some of Heidegger’s illustrations of the πρὸς ἐν ‘relation to health,’ which, he explains in *BCAP* (not impossibly with something like Shields’ correction in mind), ‘can be of various kinds’: ⁹¹

ὑγιεινὸν τῷ φυλάττειν (1003a35), “healthy” inasmuch as it “maintains and preserves” health; e.g. walking is healthy.

1906 and another from 1987, recommending the latter on account of its ‘[m]ore precise bibliographical references and extensive [...] commentary’. Indeed, all subsequent references are to the posterior edition. I can think of only one reason why the editor would mention the subsequently redundant 1906 edition in the original footnote: it must have figured in Heidegger’s manuscript.

⁹⁰ That Heidegger might favour Owen’s interpretation of core-dependent homonymy is suggested by McManus 2013.

⁹¹ *BCAP*: 127.

ὑγιεινὸν τῷ ποιεῖν (1003a35f.), “healthy” inasmuch as it “produces” health. An organ is healthy.

ὑγιεινὸν τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας (1003a36), “healthy” inasmuch as it “is a sign of health,” a healthy complexion. (*BCAP*: 127)

This short passage makes clear that Heidegger does not envisage core-dependent homonymy as a linguistic nesting of meanings of words within other meanings. Rather, all relations cited by Heidegger as exemplary of the core-dependent relation (maintenance and preservation, production, being a sign of, and so on) are extra-linguistic. They also clearly have things, rather than words, for their *relata* (walking and bodily health, an organ and bodily health, a complexion and bodily health, and so on). This makes a lot of sense if Heidegger was a Cajetanian – at any rate, Shields and Ward explain at length how each relation cited by Heidegger above instantiates some causal relation⁹² and causal relations paradigmatically connect things rather than words – but *not much* if he was an Owenite.

Heidegger’s anti-Owenite stance is corroborated by *AM*, where he says of Aristotle’s categories other than *oὐσία* that

they are always, according to their essence (*ihrem Wesen*), *spoken-with* (mitsagend) the *oὐσία*. (*GA33*: 8)⁹³

Notice that it is explicitly according to their *essence* that the secondary categories are said to be ‘spoken-with’ the primary category. Now, essences of things are, for Aristotle, extralinguistic entities. In other words, knowledge of each must be acquired by investigating the world around us rather than by merely exploiting our linguistic competence (unless, of

⁹² Shields 1999, pp. 111-114; Ward 2008, pp. 87-90.

⁹³ Cf. *AM*: 5.

course, it is itself in question).⁹⁴ But, as Irwin (1981) and Grice (1988) argue in their influential critiques, Owen's account of homonymy fails to make room for a consideration of essences understood in this way.

By contrast, Cajetan's Aristotle's claim that healthy walks (to stay with Heidegger's example) are an efficient cause of the walker's healthy body attends *precisely* to essential characteristics of walks and of the bodies of walkers as healthy. It is irrelevant to the claim under consideration that promenades responsible for Heidegger's stout body take place in the Black Forest as opposed to other places with equally excellent air, as are many characteristics predictable of Heidegger's body (male, moustached, behatted, and so on). Thus, Heidegger delivers what Cajetan's proposal demands: a consideration of essential characteristics.

Hence, we have another reason to turn to Cajetan besides Heidegger's reliance on *De Nominum Analogia* in *BCAP* (and, in all likelihood, in *AM* as well, albeit without appropriate acknowledgment). For, although Cajetan's causal and Owen's linguistic frameworks need not exhaust the space of our exegetical possibilities, they do seem to exhaust the space of our exegetical actualities, so to speak - I am simply not aware of any position in the literature that would differ significantly from the two alternatives discussed here.

For my second argument for Heidegger's endorsement of some version of Cajetan's proposal, we must make a full circle back to the beginning, and that is to say, to Heidegger's quotation of SC after the priority argument.

Aristotle's account of cognition in terms of the soul's becoming like the cognised object explicitly appeals to the notion of *formal causation*: Aristotle claims that, when a soul cognises

⁹⁴ For a discussion of Aristotle's views on homonymy against the backdrop of his broader philosophy of science, see Ward 2008, Chapter 6.

an object, it receives its form without matter. The illustration he offers for an instantiation of this process in perception helps to clarify what he is getting at:

perception is what is capable of receiving perceptible forms without the matter, as wax receives the seal of a signet ring without the iron or gold. It acquires the golden or the metallic seal, but not insofar as it is gold or metal. In a similar way, perception is also in each case affected by what has the colour or taste or sound, but not insofar as each of these is said to be something, but rather insofar as each is of a certain quality, and corresponding to its proportion. (*DA*, II, 12, 424a17-22)

Thus, on Aristotle's account, if a soul that perceives a bicycle is itself bicycle-like, it is not because it looks, sounds, smells, tastes, or feels anything like a bicycle (these are the five sensory modalities that might constitute an object of perception, according to Aristotle⁹⁵). It is, rather, because it somehow *encodes* the form of these sensory qualities in much the same way in which hot wax encodes whatever might be engraved on a signet ring, which we impress on it. It is as such that it exemplifies formal causation.

Now, Heidegger's reference to the Aristotelian account of cognition as reception of forms without matter in relation to his own argument for the priority of Dasein plainly requires a word of explanation (or two). My *second* argument is that the exegesis of the argument for the priority of Dasein in terms of core-dependent homonymy, and the exegesis of core-dependent homonymy, in turn, in terms of Cajetan's proposal, fulfils that requirement in an inordinately satisfying way. If Heidegger understands Dasein's priority as symptomatic of the core-dependent homonymy of Being, and the core-dependent homonymy of Being, in turn, after the fashion of Cajetan, then the claim of Dasein's priority demands that he be able to identify the type of causal relation connecting Dasein to beings of all other kinds. But that is

⁹⁵ Cf. *DA*: III, 1, 424b22-23.

just what SC – following shortly in the wake of PC – might be understood to deliver. For it talks about the soul's standing in the relationship of formal causation to everything that there is. So, whoever wants to have a satisfying explanation of the role of SC in the argument of the Introduction to *BT*, should not stay in the way of our Ptolemaic mutiny and, in addition, accept that Heidegger endorses Cajetan's proposal.⁹⁶

Crucially, we can now see why Heidegger can retain his composure in the face of Aristotle's problem of the unity of Being - threatening his entire enterprise in *BT* - even though his discussion of the first prejudice leaves it unanswered.

Aristotle is almost certainly right in thinking that there are no $\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta$ underpinning all manifestations of healthiness and all manifestations of the medical and *certainly right* in thinking that, in each case, scholars of each subject-matter would need to study them together regardless. Knowledge of the healthiness of the body – but not of its symptoms and causes – is hardly worth the name of medical knowledge. Similarly, any science concerned with medicine – say, history of medicine – would not get far without investigating its apparatus, practitioners, textbooks, and so forth, even though the medical nature of each differs from the medical nature of the art of medicine itself.

Cajetan adds to this an ingenuous – and plausible - explanation of just why that is the case.⁹⁷ The diverse manifestations of these unusual subject-matters belong together because their secondary instances stand in causal relations to their primary instances. Thus, a healthy regimen, for example, is an efficient cause of a healthy body, and a healthy body, in turn, an

⁹⁶ Thus, McDaniel (2017, p. 26), who accepts that the priority argument argues for the core-dependence of non-Dasein kinds of being on Dasein, but denies that Heidegger was a Cajetanian (it is unclear for what reason), finds himself in an awkward position.

⁹⁷ For a sustained defense of Cajetan's proposal see Shields 1999, pp. 110-122.

efficient cause of a healthy complexion. Similarly, medical apparatus is tied in a like fashion to the medical art, which serves as its final cause as well as the formal cause of medical practitioners and textbooks.⁹⁸ While it is not immediately clear whether - and if so, how - these Cajetanian analyses extend to a much trickier case of Aristotle's categories,⁹⁹ it should be comparatively easy to see - thanks to Heidegger's mention of SC - how they *might* extend to Heidegger's kinds of being.

If Dasein is expressly defined by its 'understanding of Being'¹⁰⁰ - conceived along the lines of the soul's capacity to receive forms without matter – then, owing to the utmost generality of Being (i.e., the first Aristotelian thread), *every* kind of being will be causally related to Dasein as its possible formal cause. But, in that case, Heidegger's inquiry into Being will have as legitimate a claim to unity as medicine and history of medicine above, notwithstanding Aristotle's argument that unity and being are not $\gamma\acute{e}v\eta$ and, indeed, McManus's (2013) more recent but no less thought-provoking paper (largely responsible for my own interest in these issues) arguing that Heidegger could never find a satisfying response to this argument.

7. Ways of Seeing Ways of Being

Ward (2008, p. 82) argues that *two* properties of the soul are crucial for cognition. One, already mentioned, is the soul's capacity to encode forms, in much the same way in which a blotch of hot wax is capable of encoding a pattern from a signet ring. But the process in which a blotch

⁹⁸ I draw these examples from Shields (1999, pp. 111-114). Ward (2008, pp. 87-90) sees things slightly differently and I do not mean to decide here between their competing accounts of Aristotle's examples.

⁹⁹ But see Ward 2008, Chapter 4.

¹⁰⁰ SZ: 12 [4].

of wax comes to *represent* the ring in this way isn't tantamount to wax's perceiving the ring. What plausibly makes the difference is the capacity for *awareness* that the soul has and the wax lacks.¹⁰¹

I will now show that Heidegger's analyses of Dasein's understanding of Being in the body of *BT* give evidence of analogues of both these features, making good on Heidegger's claim of the analogy between PC and SC from the Introduction to the book as well as on my own claim that this analogy entitles him to an original solution to Aristotle's problem of the unity of Being.

For the purposes of this exercise, I shall take two conditions to be necessary and jointly sufficient for *x*'s *representing* *y*:

- (i) *x* and *y* are isomorphic,
- (ii) this isomorphism arises from *x*'s being caused by *y*.

A sufficient mark of (i), as I understand it, is that a complete description of *x* as *F* and a complete description of *y* as *G* (where *F* refers to the capacity of *x* for encoding and *G* to the feature of *y* being encoded) overlap without coinciding. I add (ii) to ensure that we do not confuse the representer with the represented: whereas it is both the ordered couple of (a blotch of wax considered as a seal, a ring considered as signet) and the ordered couple of (the same

¹⁰¹ Interestingly, Ward makes this observation to support her claim that formal causation be excluded from our account of core-dependent homonymy as generally incompatible with homonymy. The argument is roughly this. Formal causation is compatible with homonymy in the case of cognition. But that is owing to two features of cognition cited above, absent in other cases of interest. I am not sure if I am down with this argument, but, since I show in this section that the analogues of the features in question are in evidence in Dasein, I do not need to contest it here.

ring considered as a signet, the same blotch of wax considered as a seal) that meet the first condition – complete descriptions of both items in each ordered couple will mention one and the same pattern - only the first ordered couple stands in a relationship of representing.

Unsurprisingly, the clearest evidence of isomorphism between Dasein's understanding of Being and Being comes from the form of the understanding of Being, which, to the extent that it characterises Dasein '*proximally and for the most part*',¹⁰² is the one to which Heidegger dedicates most his attention in *BT* - 'concern' (*Besorgen*).¹⁰³

Concern first emerges in Chapter 2 of Division 1 of *BT* from the following induction:

¹⁰² SZ: 16-17 [5].

¹⁰³ Might the 'for the most part'-part of this approach be another influence from *DA*, where Aristotle's analysis of the soul begins with structures found in all souls (constitutive of the 'nutritive' soul in evidence in human beings as well as in non-human animals and plants)? Cf. *DA*: II, 4, 415a23-27. It needs to be borne in mind, though, that, in contrast to Aristotle's hierarchical picture, Heidegger ultimately argues that the 'basic' forms of the understanding of Being like concern are necessarily coextensive with some of the 'advanced' forms like 'solicitude', so that the distinction between basic and advanced forms of the understanding of Being can only be provisional here. See, for example, SZ: 118 [26]. In addition, I am tempted to say that, while, for Aristotle, the faculty of nutrition is necessary for the soul, Heidegger's claim seems to be only that concern is sufficient but not necessary for the understanding of Being (even if it is a very - or even the most - common form of the understanding of Being). At any rate, it is plausible to think that it is metaphysically possible (if not actually true) that there be beings that exhibit an understanding of Being, but that do not show evidence of concern and I am not aware of any compelling evidence that Heidegger ever contests that thought (though many commentators seem to think that he does contest it).

having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining... [All] [t]hese ways of [Dasein's] Being-in have *concern* as their kind of being – a kind of being which we have yet to characterize in detail. (SZ: 56-57 [12])

The promised characterisation develops gradually in Chapters 3 and 4, where, in a fashion I characterised earlier as Husserlian – but that, like Husserl's terms 'noema' and 'noesis', in fact goes all the way back to *DA* - Heidegger begins with an analysis of the distinctive object of concern – the ready-to-hand 'stuff' (*Zeug*)¹⁰⁴ - and then works his way back.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ 'We shall call those beings which we encounter in concern "stuff." SZ: 68 [15]. Macquarrie and Robinson render '*Zeug*' as 'equipment', but this sounds way too dignified for what Heidegger is trying to achieve here: 'thrusting aside our interpretative tendencies, which keep thrusting themselves upon us and running along with us, and which conceal not only the phenomenon of such 'concern', but even more those beings themselves *as* encountered of their own accord *in* our concern with them.' SZ: 67 [15]. What we need, in the first place, is a noun that can complement 'ways of Being-in' from Heidegger's list above as their object – 'equipment' fails spectacularly in this role. Heidegger's first choice is '*Dinge*' – 'things' - but he ultimately decides against it, since the career this term enjoyed in philosophy is likely to overshadow its intended colloquial meaning. So, he settles on an even *more* colloquial term that no philosopher before him would dare to use in this capacity: '*Zeug*'.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. '[I]f one ought to say [...], for example, what the intellective or perceptual or nutritive faculty is, then one should first say what thinking is and what perceiving is, since actualities and actions are prior in account to potentialities. But if this is so, and their corresponding objects are prior to them, it would for the same reason be necessary to make some

Thus, as we already noted, ‘[t]he structure of the Being of the ready-to-hand,’ for Heidegger, ‘is determined by references (*Verweisungen*),’¹⁰⁶ and that is to say, by ways in which stuff relates to other stuff (or, in one case, people). Heidegger discusses five such relations in detail. A being is ready-to-hand to the extent that (1) it is good for stuff,¹⁰⁷ (2) it goes with stuff,¹⁰⁸ (3) it brings about stuff,¹⁰⁹ (4) it is made of stuff,¹¹⁰ and (5) the stuff it brings about serves someone.¹¹¹ Thus, my bicycle enjoys this kind of being insofar as (1) it is good for commuting, (2) it goes with other cycling equipment such as the helmet, (4) it is made of steel, plastic, rubber, and whatnot, and (3 and 5) it takes me where I need to be.

In another move that might remind us of Kant’s Copernican project, Heidegger then argues that the five references constitutive of readiness-to-hand of stuff are at the same time constitutive of a species of Dasein’s ‘understanding’ (*Verstehen*), which he calls ‘*Be-deuten*’ (the hyphen inside of what would otherwise signify ‘meaning’ or ‘signifying’ gives us an idea of something along the lines of making-clear, clearing-up, articulating, connoting with ‘*deutlich*’ - clear, explicit, intelligible):

[Dasein’s] understanding (*Verstehen*) lets itself be referred (*verweisen*) to and from these relations (*Bezügen*). We shall regard the relationality of these relations

determinations about, for instance, nourishment and the objects of perception and thought.’

DA: II, 4, 415a19-23.

¹⁰⁶ *SZ*: 74 [16].

¹⁰⁷ *SZ*: 68 [15].

¹⁰⁸ *SZ*: 68 [15].

¹⁰⁹ *SZ*: 69-70 [15].

¹¹⁰ *SZ*: 70 [15].

¹¹¹ *SZ*: 84 [18].

(*Bezugcharakter*) in terms of *clearing-up* (be-deuten). In its familiarity with these relations, Dasein “clears things up” (“*bedeuten*”) for itself [...]. The “for-the-sake-of-which” [(5) above] clears up an “in-order-to” [(1) above]; this in turn a “towards-this” [(3) above]; the latter, an “in-which” [(4) above] [...]; and that, in turn, the “with-which” [(2) above] [...]. These relations are bound up with one another as an original (*ursprünglich*) totality; they are what they are as this clearing-up (*Be-deuten*) in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood. (SZ: 87 [18])

It seems incontrovertible that, beside further illuminating the referentiality of stuff, Heidegger’s point above must be to say that a description of how things stand with my bicycle as ready-to-hand above, for example – i.e. the five ‘*Bezügen*’ or relations - also describes how things stand with me, as I concern myself with my bicycle. The concept of stuff’s referring Dasein to other stuff includes the concept of Dasein’s letting itself be referred in this way. And the concept of Dasein’s letting itself be referred in this way includes the concept of Dasein’s actually being so referred by stuff.

Still, with all due respect to the proponents of Copernican readings of *BT*, this descriptive overlap is surely imperfect. If I am what my bicycle is, it is only ‘πώς’ – ‘in a way’. I am not good for commuting. I do not go with cycling equipment in a way cycling equipment and bicycles go together. I am not made of steel, plastic, and rubber. My capacity for taking others where they need to be is comparatively limited.

Indeed, we learn in Chapter 5 of Division 1 – offering us an analysis of Dasein’s ‘Being-in’ *as such* rather than merely of a species thereof, concern - that there are deep, structural reasons why I do not merge with my vehicle. Namely, in contrast to the ‘understanding of Being’ - *Seinsverständnis* – that designates all there is to Dasein’s Being, albeit superficially (at least until we read the entire *BT*) and of which concern is a species, the ‘understanding’ –

‘*Verstehen*’ – above, of which ‘clearing things up’ (*Be-deuten*) is a species, amounts to only one of the three parts of Dasein’s Being, alongside the ‘state-of-mind’ (*Befindlichkeit*) and the ‘falling’ (*Verfallen*). Each notion is far too complicated to be satisfactorily analysed here. However, Heidegger ultimately claims that all three make up Dasein’s ‘care’ (*Sorge*), which is his official answer to the question of what Dasein’s Being, defined in the Introduction by the understanding of Being (of which, at that point, we could only have an intuitive grasp), actually consists in. Accordingly, my sustaining the referential connections of my bicycle as ready-to-hand through clearing things up – which amounts to the same process as my bicycle’s appropriately referring me to other stuff (and ultimately Daseins) – gives us only a one-third of concern. So, Dasein’s concern with stuff and the readiness-to-hand of this same stuff are (merely) isomorphic.

Still more evidence for isomorphism can be found in Heidegger’s comparatively underdeveloped analysis of ‘solicitude’ (*Fürsorge*) - the form Dasein’s Being takes when it becomes an understanding of Dasein’s Being in others. In particular, it can be found in the species of solicitude Heidegger takes to be paradigmatic, which is the kind of solicitude that manifests itself in what I’ll call the *shareability* of stuff. My bicycle is shareable in the intended sense insofar as it has been designed by someone, produced by someone else, serviced by someone else, someone else can use it, too, and so on. In short, stuff shows up covered with stamps of other Daseins, each staking a different claim on it.¹¹²

Now, when I operate my bicycle, I do not push it in front of me, wheels up, stopping every ten steps to clap my hands. Rather, I operate it *as one does*: I ride it. Heidegger famously argues that expressions such as the italicised (with ‘*man*’ in German in place of ‘one’ in English) convey an important truth about the concerned Dasein. Namely, the concerned Dasein

¹¹² For Heidegger’s analysis of this phenomenon, see SZ: 117-120 [26].

conceived as such fails to show traces of a Husserlian ‘pure I (*Ich*)’.¹¹³ Rather, it instantiates exactly the sort of thing to which, with a stretch of imagination, ‘one’ or ‘man’ might be thought to refer in such expressions, which he denominates as ‘*das Man*’ - perhaps mimicking Husserl’s (equally non-standard) capitalisation of ‘*ich*’ above (I’ll leave this untranslated as ‘the one’ gives very much the wrong idea).

Isomorphism becomes apparent when we consider the instance of *das Man* operating my bicycle (i.e., arguably myself when I operate it) alongside the Being of Dasein experienced, through shareability of stuff, in other bicycle users. We – that is to say, myself and other bicycle users – use it in the *same* way: we ride it, no fooling around. And, again, the overlap is patently imperfect. *Das Man* that manifests itself in me is concerned with *my* bicycle and other items in *its* referential network. This cannot be said about other bicycle users. Plausibly, a complete description of other bicycle users, understood as an object of the relevant kind of solicitude, will not mention any particularities of this sort. As Heidegger himself puts it, in this mode of ‘Being-with-one-another [...], the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish...’¹¹⁴ So, again, we have a case of likeness here rather than of identity.

Moreover, whilst Heidegger’s account of concern remains ambiguous about the causal direction between Dasein’s understanding of Being and Being, the case of solicitude *via* the shareability of stuff points the causal arrow just the right way. Heidegger describes at length how, ‘proximally and for the most part’, Dasein blindly follows the dictates of others (as it experiences them). For example,

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *one* takes pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *one* sees and judges; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great

¹¹³ Cf. *Ideas I*: 132 [57].

¹¹⁴ *SZ*: 126 [27].

mass' as *one* shrinks back; we find 'shocking' what *one* finds shocking. (SZ: 126-127 [27])

Thus, the paradigmatic kind of solicitude does not 'constitute' the other as Husserl might and, I think, *would* say.¹¹⁵ Rather, in a certain way, it is the other who 'constitutes' solicitude (if I may say so). Heidegger's term for this process is 'distantiality' (*Abständigkeit*).¹¹⁶ It will later inform Chapter's 5 analysis of Dasein's 'falling' in much the same way the clearing things up above informs Chapter's 5 analysis of the 'understanding.'

Still more evidence for Dasein's understanding of Being and Being satisfying (ii) above can be gleaned from Heidegger's equally famous discussion of some ways in which, on certain occasions, stuff refuses to yield to our practical projects. For example, in 'obtrusiveness', stuff goes missing with the result that some other stuff one is about to clear up *loses* its readiness-to-hand:

It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing. (SZ: 73 [16])

Though this is not exactly the scenario Heidegger has in mind above, suppose that, in the process of grocery shopping, one clears up unpacking the grocery bags and cooking a meal. Alas, it turns out that, as one was shopping, one's bicycle was stolen. In a brief moment before one realises this, unpacking and cooking a meal remain in the 'clearing'.¹¹⁷ But one does not get any closer to home – the site of unpacking and cooking a meal - anymore. According to Heidegger, at this point, the stuff of one's concern comes to be experienced under another kind

¹¹⁵ The Fifth *CM* problematises something like the shareability of stuff – under the influence of *BT*, I believe - and attempts to reconstruct it from the noetic structures of the subject.

¹¹⁶ Cf. SZ: 126-127 [27].

¹¹⁷ Cf. SZ: 133 [28].

of being – presence-at-hand – as well, and, as it does, Dasein’s understanding of Being, too, undergoes a kind of alteration – into a ‘deficient mode of concern’ to be sure, but also, precisely, into *realising* what’s going on, a species of what Heidegger calls ‘knowing’ (*Erkennen*)¹¹⁸ and associates with presence-at-hand. One no longer merely follows the tracks laid out by others of shareability. The empty space where the bicycle was forces one to stop and to reflect on what one was going to do and on what might have happened to one’s means of transport.

Unfortunately, Heidegger does not define either ‘presence-at-hand’ or ‘knowing’ in *BT*, and, as I do not have space here for organising various inferential roles he assigns to both concepts,¹¹⁹ I must leave things at that, letting the question of the specific form of their possible isomorphism hang. Still, Heidegger’s discussion of obtrusiveness makes the direction of the causal process sufficiently clear: I become reflective about stuff (and so, begin registering its presence-at-hand by way of knowing) *because of* how things stand with stuff rather than the other way round.

Finally, even Heidegger’s analysis of ‘resoluteness’ (*Entschlossenheit*) in Division 2 of *BT* – of the understanding of Being trained on oneself – emphasises Dasein’s affectivity. One way in which Dasein understands its own Being leads, according to Heidegger, through the phenomenon of a ‘call of conscience,’ which ‘summons Dasein’s Self from its lostness in *das “Man”*.’¹²⁰ ‘*In conscience*,’ Heidegger tells us, ‘*Dasein calls itself*.’¹²¹ However, his point is

¹¹⁸ SZ: 69 [15].

¹¹⁹ A very impressive survey of inferential roles of presence-at-hand followed by an attempt at their unification (and ultimately an account of something like ‘knowing’ in the relevant sense) can be found in McManus 2012.

¹²⁰ SZ: 274 [57].

¹²¹ SZ: 275 [57].

not that Dasein achieves resoluteness through some kind of introspective insight. Rather, Dasein which ‘does the calling’ is in an important sense *exterior* to ‘Dasein [...] appealed to’:¹²²

the call is [...] something which *we ourselves* have neither planned nor prepared for no voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. ‘It’ calls, against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes *from me* and yet *from beyond me*. (SZ: 275 [57])

Thus, in much the same way in which the presence-at-hand of things around Dasein is a cause of Dasein’s knowing these things and Dasein’s Being in others a cause of Dasein’s solicitude, Dasein’s resoluteness is caused by its own Being ‘*beyond me*’, ‘calling’.

We may conclude that Dasein’s understanding of Being and Being stand in the relationship of representation in the sense relevant to the analogy of proportion between PC and SC. Dasein’s understanding of Being is isomorphic with what it is an understanding of (as we know from Heidegger’s discussion of concern and solicitude). And this structural similarity results from its being exposed to Being rather than the other way round (as we know from his discussions of solicitude, cognition, and resoluteness).

So, how things stand with *awareness*?

According to Heidegger folklore, one of Heidegger’s most important contribution to the phenomenological tradition was to isolate – in concern no less – a form of intentionality that lack anything like consciousness or awareness accompanying the operations of the Aristotelian soul and, as it is noted more often, of the Husserlian noesis.¹²³ For example, in a

¹²² SZ: 275 [57].

¹²³ See, for example, Carman 2003, p. 66.

memorable passage regarding what it's like to 'see' a ready-to-hand item, Heidegger tells us that

[t]he ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection (*Umsicht*) takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves (*die Werkzeuge selbst*). On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work – that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. (SZ: 69 [15].)

Still, Heidegger does not hold that the kind of awareness that accompanies knowing is the *only* kind of awareness. Rather, he argues, it is a species of a sort of ur-awareness, which he calls the 'sight' (*Sicht*).¹²⁴

Indeed, the purport of the memorable passage above is to identify a form of sight parallel to a cognitive kind of awareness - to which Heidegger himself refers in *BT* as 'intuition'¹²⁵ (*Anschauung*) or 'just-looking [...] whatever form this takes'¹²⁶ - that might be thought to accompany Dasein's concern. Heidegger finds it in 'circumspection' (*Umsicht*) overlooking whatever one is currently operating in order to attend to the work to be produced instead.

Solicitude, too, has its own way – even ways – of seeing:

¹²⁴ SZ: 147 [31].

¹²⁵ SZ: 147 [31].

¹²⁶ SZ: 69 [15].

Just as *circumspection* belongs to concern as a way of discovering what is ready-to-hand, solicitude is guided by *considerateness* (Rücksicht) and *forbearance* (Nachsicht). Like solicitude [itself], these can range through their respective deficient and indifferent modes up to the point of *inconsiderateness* (Rücksichtlosigkeit) or the perfumctoriness (*Nachsehen*) for which indifference leads the way. (SZ: 123 [26])¹²⁷

Finally, the sight of a resolute Dasein consists in what Heidegger calls ‘transparency’ (*Durchsichtigkeit*):

We choose this term to designate ‘knowledge of the Self’ in a sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that here it is not a matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the “Self,” but rather one of seizing upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world *throughout all* the constitutive items which are essential to it, and doing so with understanding. In existing, beings sight ‘themselves’ (*sichtet “sich”*) only in so far as they have become transparent to themselves with equal primordiality in those items which are constitutive for their existence: their Being-alongside the world [i.e. the ready-to-hand stuff] and their Being-with Others. (SZ: 146 [31])

So, although it cannot be said that all forms of the understanding of Being are accompanied by cognitive awareness – by ‘just-looking... whatever form this takes’ - this does not weaken our argument. The work performed by that kind of awareness in the Aristotelian psychology is carried out in the Heideggerian one by ‘sight’ – Heidegger’s ‘universal term for characterizing any access (*Zugang*) to beings or to Being, as access in general.’¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Cf. SZ: 121-122 [26].

¹²⁸ SZ: 147 [31].

Thus, Dasein is like the soul in both respects relevant to Heidegger's case for the core-dependent homonymy of Being, as it has been reconstructed in Section 6.

8. Priority in the Causal Network

Still, if Dasein's understanding of Being consists, not in causing beings making up the world around it in any way, but in being caused *by* them in a formal way, one might wonder in what sense, if any, can Dasein's Being be said to be 'prior' to all other kinds of being. Have I not just demonstrated the opposite thing: that, in a way, Dasein is posterior – rather than prior - to everything?

In fact, with this question, we touch upon what is a nagging issue not only for my account of the core-dependent homonymy of Being in *BT*, but also for Cajetan's interpretation of core-dependent homonymy as such.

Thus, a further complaint to Cajetan submitted by Shields is that, since, in Cajetan's model, the causal connection between kinds related in the core-dependent ways can go *both* ways, he fails to explain what the primacy of the core instances of the relevant homonyms actually consists in.¹²⁹ Accordingly, an important part of both his and Ward's projects is to supply Cajetan's proposal with a further condition that would tell us why, say, it is the healthiness of a body rather than that of a diet that is the core instance of healthiness (even though, in this instance, it is healthiness in a diet that causes, and so, is in some sense prior to, healthiness of a body).

However, I argue elsewhere that neither Shields nor Ward get the primacy of the core instance right. Accordingly, I will rely here, not on either one of their accounts, but on the

¹²⁹ Cf. Shields 1999, p. 122.

account of the primacy of the core instance I develop in the same work: in terms of what I call *priority in the causal network* – PCN for short.¹³⁰

A kind enjoys PCN when at least two kinds with which it shares a name (but not nature) - and to which it is related causally as required by Cajetan's model - are not causally related to each other (directly). It is natural to think of such cases as cases of a priority of the connecting kind, because, if it were not for the causal involvement of that kind, Cajetan's account would lead us to conclude that the otherwise unconnected kinds fail to make up a single subject-matter. So, the kind enjoying PCN, as I have just defined it, is, in this sense, a 'source' of their unity as a single subject-matter; maybe even a 'principle' of that subject-matter (Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* that secondary instances of core-dependent homonyms are related to a common 'ἀρχή' – a term that, depending on context, can be translated as a source, an origin, or a principle¹³¹).

It is easy to see that PCN applies to both primary instances of Aristotle's exemplary core-dependent homonyms: healthiness and the medical. Although it might well be true that a healthy diet causes a healthy complexion, a healthy diet could not have this effect if the kind of healthiness enjoyed by it did not first cause the body, whose complexion it is, to be healthy in a way of its own. So, the kind of healthiness enjoyed by bodies enjoys PCN as I define it above. Likewise, although a medical practitioner operates, and so, acts as an efficient cause of a medical scalpel, the medical natures of a practitioner of medicine and a scalpel belong together only thanks to the causal involvement of medicine itself. Consider that the practitioner of medicine only operates a scalpel as a medical scalpel as long as she operates it in practising – and that is to say, insofar as both she and the scalpel are caused by - the medical art. Take the

¹³⁰ Cf. my unpublished.

¹³¹ *Met.*: IV, 2, 1003b6.

causal connection to medicine away (formal for the practitioner and final for the scalpel, according to Shields) and the diverse medical natures will fail to connect, as in the case of a trained surgeon using the scalpel for carving pumpkins for Halloween, engaging neither the surgeon nor the scalpel in their medical capacities, and so, failing to link them together as medical.

I have two arguments for Dasein's enjoyment of PCN: one drawing on the material from the body of *BT* examined in the preceding section and another drawing on a paragraph of the Introduction connecting the priority argument as such with the paragraph discussing SC and its aftermath, which I have slyly passed over earlier.

My *first* argument is that ready-to-hand stuff and present-at-hand things, in particular, would not connect causally as beings if it were not for Dasein's causal involvement. Again, it is best to appreciate this by considering some – in fact, no more than two – apparent counterexamples.

Recall obtrusiveness, as exemplified by the case of a stolen bicycle from Section 7. It might seem that, in cases such as this, a change in the readiness-to-hand of something (from fully ready-to-hand to only partially, or not at all, ready-to-hand) causes the presence-at-hand of something else. However, that is not really the case. Heidegger makes clear that stuff now experienced by Dasein as present-at-hand ‘has [...] been’ such ‘constantly.’¹³² So, obtrusiveness – and indeed other cases of disruption to Dasein’s concern considered by Heidegger in Section 16 of *BT* – describe causal relations running from the readiness-to-hand of stuff to Dasein’s understanding of Being (assuming the shape of a deficient concern and nascent ‘knowing’) rather than to the presence-at-hand as such.

¹³² SZ: 73 [16].

Now consider this example of an apparent causal connection running in the opposite direction. Heidegger sometimes associates presence-at-hand with the having of ‘properties’ (*Eigenschaften*)¹³³ – one of the more prominent inferential roles Heidegger reserves for this concept. It is hard to deny that many changes in properties that describe stuff – thus, in their constitution *qua* present-at-hand¹³⁴ – will lead to corresponding changes in their readiness-to-hand. Suppose that my bicycle gains a property of having a flat tire. Plausibly, this constrains its readiness-to-hand - its availability for my practical projects - and so, appears to be an instance of causation in Aristotle’s broad sense.¹³⁵

Still, recall that the referentiality that defines stuff as ready-to-hand amounts to the same process as Dasein’s clearing things up, so that any change in stuff’s readiness-to-hand overlaps with a change in Dasein’s understanding of Being. So, my bicycle’s gaining a property of a flat tire causes its unreadiness-to-hand only insofar as both kinds of being are causally connected to Dasein’s understanding of Being. So, the unity of readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand as instances of Being *does* hinge on Dasein’s Being, after all.

¹³³ Cf. SZ: 73 [16].

¹³⁴ McDaniel (2013) denies that anything could be both present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. However, I argue in Section 3 of my forthcoming that none of his arguments for this (very controversial) claim convinces.

¹³⁵ Generally, Aristotle appears to use ‘cause’ (*aitíā*) for anything that answers some ‘why?’ or ‘on account of what?’ type of question. Cf. ‘[W]e think that we have knowledge of a thing only when we can answer the question about it ‘On account of what?’ and that is to grasp the primary cause...’ *Ph.*, II, 3, 194b17-21. Thus, his theory of four causes effectively claims that there are no more – and no less - than four kinds of answer to this question.

I submit my *second* argument for Dasein's enjoyment of PCN as at the same time a possible interpretation of the third priority, which, Heidegger claims in the Introduction, accrues to Dasein if the priority argument succeeds (the reader must forgive my ignoring the first two priorities, but I have no idea just what to do with them¹³⁶):

Dasein also possesses – as constitutive for its understanding of existence [i.e., of its own Being¹³⁷] – an understanding of the Being of all beings of a character other than its own. Dasein has therefore a third priority as providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontologies. (SZ: 13 [4])

Clearly, Heidegger justifies the third priority by citing the same feature of Dasein PC talks about (in the first sentence above). Equally clearly, PCN is a plausible candidate for the kind of priority he might have in mind here (see my earlier remarks about Aristotle's employment of 'ἀρχή' in *Metaphysics*, Gamma 2) and 'any' - in the second sentence above - suggests to me an argument for Dasein's enjoyment of PCN, irrespective of what kinds of being, in particular, we might think there are besides Dasein.

¹³⁶ Cf. 'The first priority is an *ontic* one: Dasein is a being whose Being has the determinate character of existence. The second priority is an *ontological* one: Dasein is itself 'ontological', because existence is thus determinative for it.' SZ: 13 [4]. To be clear, what I think is hard to understand here is *not* what the alleged priorities are owed to - i.e. Dasein's having the character of existence and its being 'ontological' - as both features of Dasein are explained reasonably clearly in the same section of *BT*. Rather, it is how these features of Dasein translate into priorities in any philosophically interesting sense.

¹³⁷ Cf. SZ: 12 [4].

If ‘Being is,’ indeed, ‘the most general concept,’¹³⁸ even possible objects that do not stand, as beings, in a direct causal connection to any of the remaining kinds of being other than Dasein, ought to be considered as (possible) beings. For, I have just conceived of all beings standing in a direct causal relationship to some kind of being other than Dasein *and* of those possible objects - if Being is the most general concept, it cannot be any less general than what I have just conceived of. So, there are – possibly non-actual – beings that can be integrated into the subject-matter of Heidegger’s inquiry into Being only thanks to Dasein and its understanding of Being, which, in order to be what it is, could not possibly fail to be affected by even such beings. Thus, Dasein provides the condition for the possibility of any ontologies, including ontologies of possible kinds of being unconnected to any kinds of being other than Dasein’s Being.

I conclude that, even though the inherently passive role of Dasein’s understanding of Being does, in a sense, make it posterior to everything, Dasein still enjoys the relevant priority of the ‘ontico-ontological’ kind.

Therefore, if the soul is, indeed, all beings – if only ‘in a way’ - then Dasein is, in a way, the soul (albeit of an Aristotelian, and so, resolutely mortal, variety¹³⁹).

¹³⁸ SZ: 3 [1].

¹³⁹ While Aristotle does ascribe immortality to the generative faculty of thought in Chapter 5 of the third book of *DA*, it has been disputed whether this generative faculty is actually a part of any human soul and Heidegger, at any rate, stresses in *BT* – rightly, I believe - that, for Aristotle, the soul is, in a way, all beings in virtue of its passive faculties, and particularly the passive faculty of thought, rather than the generative one. See footnote 8 above for more discussion.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

Aristotle's Works

Cat. *Categories*

DA *De Anima*

Met. *Metaphysics*

NE *Nicomachean Ethics*

Ph. *Physics*

Top. *Topics*

(In all cases, I relied on translations from Clarendon Aristotle Series with occasional – but purely stylistic – deviations.)

Heidegger's Works

AM *Aristotle's Metaphysics θ 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, trans. W. Brogan and P. Warnek, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

BCAP *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. R. Rojcewicz, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008.

GA33 *Aristoteles, Metaphysik θ 1-3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990.

HCT *The History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, trans. T. Kisiel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1985.

LH 'The Letter on Humanism', trans. F. A. Capuzzi and J. G. Grey, in M. Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, ed. D. F. Krell, revised edition, New York: Harper Perennial, 2008.

- SZ *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006.
- PICPR *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Emad and K. Maly, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.

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